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ECONOMIC MOBILISATION FOR WAR.

NEVER has there been a war in which economics played so prominent a part as it plays in the great European upheaval of to-day. Victory depends as much—perhaps more—upon economic resources and economic organisation as upon men and strategical skill. The importance of numbers and military training must not, indeed, be underrated; both are essential to success, as they have always been in the past. But the best trained and best led modern army cannot fight efficiently in the field unless it is backed and supported by a powerful organisation of industry and business. Food and clothing must be provided in greater quantity and diversity than was formerly thought necessary. Equipment of innumerable kinds, and an unceasing supply of engines and munitions of war, must be manufactured and delivered in constant profusion.

The economic organisation of war involves very much more than the gathering into the hands of the Government, by taxation, by borrowing, or otherwise of a large part of the national resources. It implies that the character of production must be altered, that from making goods such as are normally required in time of peace, industry must be adapted to produce the goods required in time of war. The industrial system must be made to yield in large quantities commodities which it has been accustomed to produce only in small quantities. But further than this, the adjustment of industry to meet the new requirements must be effected at a time when the normal processes have received a shock from the outbreak of war, and when a large number of men have to be withdrawn from the labour market to serve in the armed forces. Moreover, the needs of the civilian population cannot be ignored. Civilians must be kept in health and strength, and to this end the Government must see that the flow of goods and services available for their consumption is not unduly restricted, either generally or in any particular direction. The consumption of luxuries may be unsparingly cut down, many comforts and amenities of life may be sacrificed, and the resources normally directed to the production of goods for purposes of development may be turned to other uses, but the activities necessary for preserving a decent standard of living among the various classes of the community must be maintained.

The economic problems which have had to be faced in the present war are much more intricate than was the case a century ago, on account of the greater complexity of the economic structure. During the past hundred years commercial intercourse between nations has developed by leaps and bounds, stimulated especially by the cheapening of transport which followed the invention of the railway and the steamship. This development is an outstanding feature in the economic history of the past century. The results have been, on the one hand, much closer co-operation between the inhabitants of different countries than ever existed before, and on the other hand a much keener commercial rivalry. Nations have become less self-sufficient. They depend upon one another for their foodstuffs, their raw materials, their manufactured goods. The international trade of the world now amounts to over £3,000,000,000 a year, compared with only £200,000,000 a century ago. At the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the United Kingdom was practically self-sufficing in respect of wheat; at the present time she imports about five-sixths of the amount consumed. Consider again the extent to which Great Britain relies upon the Colonies and foreign countries for meat, butter, eggs, tea, sugar, and innumerable other foodstuffs. A very large amount of the raw material for our manufacturing industries is derived from over the seas, and the cutting off of these imports would be only less serious than the cutting off of our food supply. A hundred years ago the cotton industry was almost the only one which relied largely on abroad for its raw material. Imports of manufactured goods, though not so essential to the economic fabric as imports of food or raw materials, are nevertheless of considerable importance. A striking instance of the inconvenience which may be caused by the stopping of imports is the disorganisation resulting from our inability to obtain dyestuffs from Germany after the outbreak of war.

The continuance of the export trade is also a vital national interest. It is largely by selling in foreign markets that we are able to purchase the goods which we import. It is indeed true that the inhabitants of the United Kingdom have in past years lent large quantities of goods abroad as capital, that the value of these investments is estimated at the huge total of £3,500,000,000, and that the interest and dividends which accrue annually upon this capital amount to about £190,000,000. It would appear, therefore, that for some time the United Kingdom could obtain its imports without sending exports to foreign markets, that goods representing interest could be imported, and that further imports could be obtained by withdrawing capital as it fell due for repayment or by selling securities abroad. This is the case up to a certain point, but as events have proved only up to a certain point. For in

normal times the Colonies and foreign countries are accustomed to look to the London capital market for fresh loans approximately equal in value to the amount which they have to pay as interest and dividends. If fresh loans are suddenly refused, they experience difficulty in meeting interest charges and in repaying capital as it falls due, and are therefore not in a position to purchase securities from British holders.

The ramifications of finance are as complex and as far-reaching as those of trade. Up to a certain point, indeed, the two are indistinguishable, for trade involves finance. At any given time an immense mass of goods is passing on its way from the producer to the consumer. The producer probably wishes to obtain the value of his goods at the time when he parts from them; the consumer will not pay for the goods until they reach him. It rests, therefore, with the merchant to own the goods moving from the producer to the consumer. The merchant, however, has not an unlimited capital of his own. He therefore borrows money upon the bills accepted by his customers. The usual procedure is for him to take the bill to an accepting house, which in return for a commission guarantees that the bill will be met when due, and the bill can then be discounted on favourable terms with a bill broker or a bank. A very large amount of trade is financed in this way in the city of London. A large part of the business is in connection with trade between foreign countries, which does not otherwise concern Great Britain. The bill on London has become in fact a universally acceptable method of payment between merchants all over the world.

In addition to advancing money to finance trade, a great business is done in the City of London in financing industries of various kinds in foreign countries. Accepting houses frequently undertake to guarantee bills known as finance bills, by discounting which foreign customers can obtain funds to finance industries, or for other purposes. The bills run for short periods, and as with trade bills must be paid at maturity, though of course fresh advances are frequently made. A great business is also done in London in connection with the issue of loans for longer dates and with the flotation of companies. In addition, banks and other financial houses lend important sums to Stock Exchange firms in connection with speculation.

It is obvious that any sudden blow dealt at this complicated system of finance must produce a paralysing effect upon the Money Market and a serious reaction upon trade and industry. The position filled by London in the world of finance, and the extent to which international payments are made through British financial houses make the United Kingdom particularly vulnerable in this respect. It was in the sphere of finance that the most prompt and

drastic action had to be taken by the Government during the crisis at the end of July last.

In passing on to consider more closely a few of the measures actually adopted by the Government for adjusting the economic system to the requirements of war, it will be convenient to group the problems selected for discussion under three main headings: (a) The shock to the economic system caused by the outbreak of war, (b) The national finances, and (c) Industrial adjustments required to meet the needs of war. Finally a short section will be added touching upon permanent effects likely to be wrought by the war upon economic organisation.

(a) THE SHOCK TO THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM.

The political crisis at the end of July 1914, reacted instantaneously and in a most alarming manner upon the world of finance. The fabric of credit is built upon confidence, and when confidence is shaken credit begins to totter. The spread among business men of fear that money owing to them would not be paid, and that money owing from them would be called in, produced a widespread scramble to liquidate the financial position. The general public indeed remained wonderfully calm and self-possessed, and there was a conspicuous absence of the rush to withdraw bank deposits which has been so frequently associated with financial panics. The amounts withdrawn at the end of July were little above the normal for the time of the year. Among the banks, on the other hand, much more alarm was manifested, partly owing to fear as to what the attitude of their depositors would be, and partly because they saw that their holdings of bills, which they had always regarded as the most liquid part of their assets, were in danger of becoming unrealisable. They promptly took steps to call in advances made to their customers at home and abroad. But just as the banks themselves cannot during a "run" meet a sudden demand by their depositors for payment in cash, because their resources are not immediately available, so the persons to whom the banks lend their money are unable to meet demands of a like kind at a moment's notice. One of the most striking features of the situation was the extent to which advances made to foreigners were called in. As has been shown above, the London Money Market had lent vast sums to foreigners in order to finance trade, and for other purposes. These borrowers were, on the whole, perfectly solvent, but they were quite unable to meet the large demands suddenly made upon them. Even if they could have paid cash in some foreign country, they could not remit the money to London, because the supply of bills on London was entirely inadequate for their requirements, while other methods of remitting money, namely the sale of securities in London and the shipment

of gold, were checked by the closing of the Stock Exchange and the high rates of insurance which prevailed even before the actual outbreak of war. The supply of bills on London could be increased by the shipment of goods to the United Kingdom, but the goods were not ready and the process involved time. The supply of bills, therefore, was too small for the huge demand, and the price rose violently, but a very large number of foreign borrowers found it quite impossible to remit money to London. The situation is forcibly described by Mr. Hartley Withers,¹ who writes :—

The chief reason for the suddenness and fulness of the blow that fell on London was nothing else but her own overwhelming strength. She was so strong and so lonely in her strength that her strength overcame her. She held the world in fee with so mighty a grip that when she said to the rest of the world, "Please pay what you owe me," the world could only gasp out, "But how can I pay you if you don't lend me the wherewithal?"

Reference has been made to the closing of the Stock Exchange, which occurred on Friday, July 31st. The difficulties of the Stock Exchange were similar in their essence to those which affected the banks, the discount houses, and the accepting houses—namely, the calling in of money advanced, combined with inability to obtain remittances from abroad. Stock Exchange firms normally borrow large amounts from the banks to finance speculation, depositing stocks with the banks as security. When prices fall the banks usually demand additional cover for their loans, and in case of default sell the securities lodged with them. At the end of last July, however, the position was that brokers, on the one hand, had large amounts owing to them from abroad in consequence of continental purchases earlier in the settlement; and, on the other hand, that a subsequent flood of selling orders drove prices down to an abnormally low level. The demand of the banks for additional cover or for repayment of loans would, therefore, have resulted in a large number of defaults among Stock Exchange firms. Hence the closing of the Stock Exchange, which prevented quotations from falling still further, and avoided giving the banks a handle for demanding further cover, while it also prevented them from selling the securities which they held.

The action of the Government, acting after consultation with prominent men in the city, may now be briefly outlined. The first step was the "suspension" of the Bank Act, combined with the raising of the Bank of England discount rate to 10 per cent. The so-called "suspension" of the Bank Act meant that the Government undertook to introduce a Bill into Parliament indemnifying the Bank of England against the consequences of illegally issuing

1. *The War and Lombard Street.*

a larger amount of notes uncovered by gold than it was allowed by law to do. The effect was to provide an increased amount of currency. The object of raising the discount rate to 10 per cent. was to check unnecessary borrowing from the Bank. The latter measure, however, has been adversely criticised as being based on too rigid an adherence to earlier practice, and being calculated to increase rather than to diminish public alarm. Doubtless it would have been better not to have raised the Bank Rate above 6 per cent. or 7 per cent. In view of the fact that Bank of England notes are issued in amounts of not less than £5, and that the public has little use for them in effecting everyday purchases, it was decided to issue Treasury notes of £1 and 10/-, which might be lent to the Banks to enable them to meet the demands of their depositors. As this new currency was not available at the moment, it was decided to prolong the August Bank holiday for three days, in order that the notes might be printed.

While provision was thus made to meet the demands of the public for additional currency, the major problem had to be solved: the problem, that is to say, of enabling borrowers to meet their obligations when they could not obtain remittances from their debtors. The solution consisted of the introduction, on the one hand, of a moratorium, and on the other hand of arrangements by which the Bank of England, with the guarantee of the Government, undertook to advance money on approved securities. A partial moratorium relating to bills of exchange only was proclaimed on Monday, August 3rd, the effect of which was to enable accepting houses to postpone for a month payment of any bill accepted before August 3rd and falling due, subject to interest at the rate of 6 per cent. On August 7th a further proclamation was issued protecting almost all classes of debtors for a month. The period in both cases was subsequently extended, and the moratoria did not finally lapse until November. The moratoria did little in themselves to straighten out business in the city; what they did was to gain time, and thus make it possible for other measures to be taken, while the mere lapse of time tended in some measure to restore public confidence. It may be noted in this connection that the banks availed themselves of the provisions of the moratorium only to a very limited extent and for a brief period.

The most important measures taken to cauterize the wounds in the financial organism were a series of arrangements for advancing money to financial houses which could not, owing to the war, obtain payment from their debtors. It was announced on August 13th that the Bank of England would discount all approved bills which had been accepted before August 4th, and the Government undertook to make good to the Bank of England any loss which it might incur in the process. It was also provided that the Bank of

England would forego recourse against the holders of bills. This meant that the banks which took bills to the Bank of England to be discounted were relieved of liability in the event of a bill not being finally met. But previous holders of the bills, in particular the accepting houses, were not relieved of liability in this way. The Bank of England undertook to give acceptors of bills the opportunity until further notice of postponing payment, on the understanding that interest would be charged to them at 2 per cent. above bank rate. Under this arrangement large amounts of bills were discounted at the Bank of England, and it was believed that the financial machine would again begin to work. Experience, however, showed that this was not the case. Trade had been crippled, and the supply of new bills on London created was small. Accepting houses were still afraid that their customers would find difficulty in remitting, and were therefore unwilling to extend further credit to them. This in turn tended to prevent the exchanges from working. More drastic remedies were evidently required to set the machinery right. Accordingly, it was announced early in September that instead of buying from the banks bills accepted before the moratorium, the Bank of England would lend money to the accepting houses to meet them. Repayment would not be demanded until a year after the end of the war, and the claim of the Bank of England upon the assets of the acceptors was to rank behind the claim of those who held bills accepted after the moratorium. It was further arranged that the joint stock banks, with the co-operation if necessary of the Bank of England, would advance to the accepting houses the amounts necessary to pay their acceptances at maturity. These measures went a long way to ease the position of the accepting houses during and for a time after the war. The exchanges became more normal, and the financial machine gradually got into working order. It may be noted, however, that the accepting houses have not been relieved of final responsibility for their acceptances, and their ultimate position therefore depends upon the ability of their customers to meet obligations after the war. For this or for some other reason, there is no doubt that the prestige of the accepting houses has suffered, and their acceptances are not regarded so favourably as was the case before the war. Whether the accepting houses will recover their former position after the war is over will no doubt depend largely upon the extent to which they are called upon in respect of their acceptances, upon their ability to meet these calls, and generally upon the solvency of those who were their customers before the war.

Details of the government scheme for relieving the difficulties of the Stock Exchange were announced at the end of October. It was stated that, with a view to avoiding the necessity for forced

realisation on a large scale of securities held as cover for account to account loans, the Government had arranged with the Bank of England to make advances to certain classes of lenders in order to enable them to continue their loans until after the end of the war. The banks, who are the principal lenders to Stock Exchange firms, were not, indeed, included in this scheme, but it was explained that all banks to which the Government had given the right to borrow Treasury notes, had agreed not to press for repayment of loans or require the deposit of further margin until after the war. Arrangements were made with the Bank of England to advance to other lenders to Stock Exchange firms 60 per cent. of the value of the securities held by the lenders against any loans which they had outstanding on July 29th, 1914. The securities were to be valued for the purpose of the advance at the making up prices of the July 29th settlement, and the rate of interest was to be 1 per cent. above Bank rate, with a minimum of 5 per cent. When any of the securities against which advances were outstanding reached the settlement price of July 29th, the bank concerned, or the Bank of England, as the case might be, was given the right of demanding repayment of loans to the extent of the value of the securities, and in case of default of selling the securities. In this way provision was made for a gradual liquidation of speculative positions outstanding at the end of July, and as prices improved a large amount of stocks was liquidated. The scheme, however, did not directly lead to the reopening of the Stock Exchange; indeed the Government, in return for its assistance, required that the Committee of the Stock Exchange should not reopen the Stock Exchange without submitting the proposed date and conditions to the Treasury, and obtaining its consent. The object of this was to enable steps to be taken to prevent enemy countries from realising securities in London. The Stock Exchange was eventually opened to business on January 4th, though business was not freed from the encumbrance of minimum prices.

The principle of extending public credit through the medium of the Bank of England or otherwise to those whose business was crippled by the outbreak of war has been extended beyond the limits of the City of London. The Treasury announced on November 3rd that a committee consisting of representatives of the Treasury, the Bank of England, the joint stock banks, and the Association of Chambers of Commerce had been formed for the purpose of authorising advances in approved cases to British traders carrying on an export business. Advances were to be made in respect of debts outstanding in foreign countries and the Colonies, including unpaid foreign and colonial acceptances, which could not be collected for the time being. The committee has absolute discretion in authorising advances up to 50 per cent. of

the outstandings. In this way solvent traders could obtain funds to continue their business and to pay their commercial debts to other traders or manufacturers.

Another example of the use of public credit to sustain the business of individual traders is found in the scheme for advancing money to the Liverpool cotton merchants. In this case the assistance given was in the form of a joint guarantee by the Government, the Liverpool Cotton Association and the Liverpool banks, of advances made to merchants by those banks. The difficulties of the cotton merchants were very similar to those of the Stock Exchange. They could not obtain payment from abroad on previous sales of cotton, and the sharp break in cotton prices made it necessary for them to write down the value of stocks, while the banks were inclined to demand more cover for their loans. Like the Stock Exchange, the Liverpool Cotton Exchange had to be closed for some months to speculative dealings. It was arranged that advances were to be made upon terms similar to those applicable in the scheme for relief to British traders in respect of debts abroad. Repayment of principal and interest was guaranteed as to 50 per cent. by the Government, and as to 25 per cent. by the Liverpool Cotton Association, leaving a risk of 25 per cent. to be assumed by the banks. It may be noted that the guarantee applies only to advances required by the borrower to meet market differences from 5d. per lb. downwards, which he may have paid, or may have to pay, in respect of cotton future contracts. The scheme appears to have been successful in its objects, and made it possible to open the Cotton Exchange to "future" trading.

The government scheme for dealing with insurance against war risks at sea was one of the few emergency measures which had been thought out in detail before the war crisis began. It was obviously important that commerce should not be interrupted by reason of inability to cover war risks of ships and cargoes, and that insurance rates should not be excessive. A scheme had been prepared, in view of a possible emergency, by a sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This scheme was put into operation immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. An arrangement was made with the big mutual insurance associations, with which the great bulk of British shipping is insured, in virtue of which the Government undertook to bear 80 per cent. of all risks in respect of voyages begun after the outbreak of war. In return the State was to receive 80 per cent. of the premiums, and was to have the right to vary the rates charged within a maximum of 5 per cent. and a minimum of 1 per cent. For the insurance of cargoes, a State Insurance Office was opened in London, to insure cargoes in British ships insured under the scheme which started on voyages after the outbreak of war. A flat rate varying from time to time

within a maximum of five guineas per cent. and a minimum of one guinea per cent. was to be charged, irrespective of the voyage or the character of the cargo. The scheme worked with marked success from the beginning, and greatly assisted the continuance of trade by reducing premiums and restoring confidence.

In addition to introducing these various schemes for restoring the finance and commerce of the country to a more normal condition after the breakdown at the end of July 1914, the Government has endeavoured to supplement private enterprise in obtaining certain goods which it has been difficult to obtain owing to the war. These commodities comprise sugar and dye-stuffs normally derived in large quantities from Germany; and wheat imported from India.

In regard to the supply of sugar, an announcement was made on September 11th to the effect that a Royal Commission had been appointed "to inquire into the supply of sugar in the United Kingdom; to purchase, sell, and control the delivery of sugar on behalf of the Government; and generally to take such steps as may seem desirable for maintaining the supply." Four weeks later it was announced that in order to avoid a sugar famine in consequence of the supply of beet sugar from Germany, Austria, and Belgium being stopped, 900,000 tons of raw sugar had been purchased in Demerara, Java, Mauritius, and elsewhere, at the price of about £20 per ton. It was arranged that this sugar should be sold virtually at cost price to the refiners, who undertook to sell it when refined at a fixed price, based upon the cost of the article plus a fair manufacturing profit.

The problem of obtaining an adequate supply of aniline and other dye-stuffs could only be solved by setting up works for the production of dyes. With the exception of an unimportant quantity of dyes produced in Great Britain or imported from Switzerland, and of some natural indigo imported from the East, the whole of the colouring materials used in the textile industry are normally obtained from Germany. At the outbreak of war, Germany prohibited the export of dye-stuffs, and British consumers therefore had to rely on such stocks as existed, and on what could be produced outside Germany. In the middle of November it was announced that the Government had made arrangements to encourage the immediate expansion of the various existing sources of supply as an interim measure. With reference to the permanent supply, a scheme was under consideration for forming a limited company with a large capital, of which the bulk would be subscribed by the consumers of dye-stuffs and colours, and others interested, the Government indicating their willingness, conditionally on this being done, to subscribe a certain proportion of the share capital, and to guarantee the interest on a large debenture capital for a term of years. The scheme first put forward did not

meet with the necessary support, and a modified scheme was submitted at the end of January. It was proposed to form a company with a share capital of £2,000,000, of which £1,000,000 should be issued in the first instance. The Government would make to the company a loan for twenty-five years corresponding to the amount of share capital subscribed up to a total of £1,000,000, and a smaller proportion beyond that total. The Government advance was to bear interest at 4 per cent. per annum, payable out of net profits, the interest to be cumulative only after the first five years. Until the loan should be repaid, the company's dividend was to be limited to 6 per cent. In addition to making a loan to the company, the Government undertook for a period of ten years to make a grant to the company for the purposes of experimental and laboratory work up to an aggregate of £100,000. A company was eventually constituted on these lines, though the full amount of capital appealed for was not obtained. Options have been exercised for the purchase of dye-works in this country, and steps have been taken to increase the output of dyes. The task before the company is by no means an easy one, for the German dye-stuff industry has only been built up after years of research, and many shades of colour produced in Germany cannot be produced in this country because the secret of their manufacture is unknown. But in any case, so long as the dyes cannot be imported, the new company will be of great assistance to the textile industry.

A further important step taken by the Government was its decision last April to control the Indian wheat export. The necessity for regulating the trade sprang from the serious rise in the price of wheat in Northern India, in sympathy with the simultaneous rise in other parts of the world. In the interests of the Indian consumer it was desirable to keep down prices in India, but at the same time it was undesirable entirely to cut off one of India's chief exports. It was estimated that this year's crop would yield an exportable surplus of at least 2,000,000 tons in excess of the normal Indian consumption. The Indian Government decided to prohibit absolutely the export of wheat on private account until March 31st, 1916. The export trade was to be entirely in the hands of the Government, which appointed as its agents the firms usually engaged in the trade. The maximum price to be offered by these firms to Indian sellers, instead of being regulated by the price ruling in London, was to be determined from time to time by the Government of India. It was announced that the price would be gradually reduced so that there should be no inducement to hold up supplies in India. Under this ingenious arrangement, a large quantity of wheat has been exported from India, and the price in Great Britain has been considerably reduced, while the price in India has been kept near its normal level.

(b) THE NATIONAL FINANCES.

To meet expenditure entailed by the war the Government has had to undertake financial operations of vast magnitude. Expenditure for naval and military operations alone will represent during the current financial year about one-third of the normal national income in time of peace. Including civil expenditure, and the amount to be advanced to the Dominions and to our Allies, the total sum which has to be found by the Government, assuming that the war continues until March 31st of next year, is estimated at £1,136,434,000, which is about half the nation's income for a normal year. It may be noted that the rate of expenditure is increasing. During the first four months the war cost £102,000,000, during the next four it cost £177,000,000, and the maximum rate of expenditure has not yet been reached. It must be emphasised that these sums of money and the goods and services which they represent have got to be made available now, during the progress of the war. So far as society is concerned there is no question of throwing the burden onto the future; although, of course, so far as a resort is made to borrowing, interest will have to be paid to individual lenders in the future, involving a redistribution of the national income in years to come. Except in so far as the productive resources of the community are injured, war does not mortgage the future from the social point of view.

The funds which may be drawn upon for the purpose of financing war represent two classes of wealth, viz., current production and savings. The extent to which a war can be financed by a drain upon savings is not without limits. The savings of past years are for the most part represented by concrete capital such as houses, factories, docks, railways, and ships. These cannot readily be converted into goods suitable for use in time of war. It is true that capital goods wear out in course of time, and that they require replacement and renewal. In the stress of war it is possible to postpone part of the normal replacements and renewals, and to devote the money and the resources which would have been spent in maintaining capital to producing goods for military purposes. No doubt both private individuals and business firms have in fact put off expenditure upon maintenance of buildings and plant, but the funds which can thus be liberated cannot in the course of a year be very great.

There is another way in which the expenditure of the British Government can be, and has been, financed out of past savings. It has already been pointed out that a very great amount of capital—roughly some £3,500,000,000—has been accumulated and invested abroad. If foreigners can be induced to purchase the securities which represent these investments, or otherwise to refund the capital lent, the proceeds can be used for the purposes of the

war. Practically it is impossible for foreigners to purchase securities or refund capital to any large extent, except from their own current production. There is no doubt that foreign nations—and especially the United States—have been able to take over in this way a large amount of British capital. Force of circumstances has induced them to increase the margin between the amount which they produce and the amount which they consume, and to supply to this country an unusually large value of goods, while receiving from the United Kingdom much less than at normal times. Clearly, however, the extent to which foreign nations can enable British investors to realise their capital depends upon their ability and willingness to save, either by cutting down their consumption or by increasing their output; upon their capacity to supply Great Britain with the kind of goods required; and upon their willingness to purchase securities or otherwise refund capital. In all respects the citizens of the United States have proved their capacity and willingness to assist British citizens to finance the war.

The current savings of the community which may be borrowed, and the wealth which can be transferred to the Government by taxation, form another source from which the war is financed. The net savings of the British nation were estimated in the Report on the First Census of Production at £150,000,000 to £170,000,000 in 1907. There is no doubt that the amount has been very much greater (probably some £300,000,000) in recent years, but it is difficult yet to form any definite opinion as to the effects of the war upon the amount currently saved. The wealthier classes of the community, which perform the great bulk of the saving in normal times, have on the whole reduced their expenditure, but they are paying more in taxation, and their income is probably less than before the war. It is not clear, therefore, that these classes have since the outbreak of war increased the amount of current savings which can be borrowed by the Government. It is possible that the working classes, whose income has undoubtedly increased owing to higher rates of wages, absence of unemployment, and overtime, have saved more than usual, but there is some evidence to show that their scale of expenditure has also increased.

The financial policy actually adopted by the Government has enlisted support in varying degrees from all the sources indicated above. For some months expenditure was met by borrowing upon Treasury Bills in the Money Market. As creditors had made abnormal efforts to withdraw advances made to borrowers both at home and abroad, and as large amounts of bills had been discounted at the Bank of England under the moratorium, money was unusually abundant, and the Government was able to borrow for short periods at very low rates. In December the War Loan of £350,000,000 was issued, the rate of interest being nominally $3\frac{1}{2}$

per cent., though practically 4 per cent., owing to the loan being issued below par, and being redeemable in 1928. When the proceeds of this loan had all been spent, the Government again began to borrow large amounts on Treasury Bills. A plan was adopted by which the Government instead of offering a fixed amount of Treasury Bills to be taken up by tender, undertook to borrow any sums offered at a rate fixed by itself. The total amount borrowed in this way between 14th April and 5th June was £152,812,000, an amount sufficient to cover the cost of the war during this period, and to pay off £30,000,000 of old bills. This floating debt will probably be funded out of the proceeds of the new loan now being offered for subscription.

While the policy of the Government in the short loan market has tended to check advances to other would-be borrowers by raising discount rates, the Treasury has endeavoured to check the issue of new loans on the capital market, and the importing of securities. It was announced in January that, with a view to husbanding the financial resources of the country, projects for new issues of capital must be submitted to the Treasury for its approval before the issue takes place. Issues for undertakings in the United Kingdom would only be permitted where it was shown that they were "advisable in the national interest." To obtain approval for issues on account of undertakings in the British Empire overseas, the existence of "urgent necessity and special circumstances" must be demonstrated. It was laid down that no issues would be permitted for undertakings outside the British Empire. To hinder the purchase of securities from abroad (especially from enemy countries) regulations were laid down in connection with the opening of the Stock Exchange at the beginning of January. No securities were to be good delivery on the Stock Exchange unless supported by the declaration of a banker, broker, or other responsible party that they have remained in physical possession in the United Kingdom since September 30th, and had not since the outbreak of war been in enemy ownership. Moreover, no securities to bearer or endorsed in blank were to be good delivery unless impressed with the Government stamp dated previous to October 1st, and accompanied by a declaration similar to that required above. By these regulations the Government has to a large extent secured for itself a first claim upon the available capital of the nation. Whether the measures taken will prove adequate in view of the enormous sums required cannot yet be determined. Should voluntary savings and voluntary withdrawals of capital from abroad prove inadequate it might prove feasible to adopt some measure of compulsion either by forced loans or by expropriating owners of certain kinds of foreign securities which could be sold abroad.

There are, however, other methods of obtaining money which

would probably be found simpler. The most obvious method is taxation. Although, since the war began, the super-tax has been increased, the income tax has been doubled, and the customs duty on tea has been raised 3d. per lb., the limits of taxation are far from having been reached. The total revenue of the country during the present financial year is estimated at £270,332,000, compared with an estimate for 1914-15 (made before the war) of £207,146,000, so that the revenue is only about 30 per cent. higher than in peace time. Another method of increasing the resources available for the conduct of war would be to check the consumption of commodities which do not fall in the category of "necessaries," and thus to increase the national savings which might be borrowed. Probably an increase of taxation will be essential if the war continues for long, because in that case the revenue on the present basis would leave no margin after paying interest on the National Debt.

(c) INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENTS.

It is the industrial organisation of war that presents what are perhaps the most difficult problems to be solved by the Government. At a time when a large part of the able-bodied manhood of the country is required to serve in the armed forces, the character of industrial production has to be altered. Vast quantities of guns, ammunition, military clothing, and equipment of all kinds are urgently wanted, and must be turned out with the greatest possible speed. In many cases the existing supplies of plant and labour, specialised to the production of a particular line of goods, are inadequate to meet the abnormal demand. Workpeople and machinery from other industries must consequently be induced to adapt themselves to produce goods which they are not accustomed to produce. Thus coal miners have become machine tenders, and textile machine works are manufacturing shell fuses. The work of men has to be done by women or by juveniles. Labour has to be moved from one part of the country to another. The process of adaptation and substitution has to be extended, in some cases, to raw materials of which the supplies are inadequate and incapable of being rapidly increased. Thus when thick leather is not available, army boots must be made with a double thickness of thin leather. The industrial system, in a word, must be stretched and squeezed to make it produce goods which, in quantity or quality, it was not intended to produce.

The work of securing the necessary adjustments and of seeing that they are effected with a minimum of waste and delay rests upon the Government. The difficulty of such a task no doubt varies greatly from one country to another, according to the normal character of the nation's industry, according to the extent to which

preparations for war have been made in advance, and according to the degree in which the national institutions and the state of public opinion lend themselves to direction at the hands of a central authority. In this country the problem of obtaining the necessary output of uniforms or military boots is much simpler than the problem of manufacturing arms and ammunition in large quantities. On the other hand, a country like Germany, which has prepared its army and its industries for war through long years of peace, has fostered the munitions industry, and has endeavoured to prevent the decay of industries whose loss would lead to inconvenience in time of war. Again, the institutions and the national spirit of Germany are those of a military state, and stand in sharp contrast to the democratic and non-military organisation of the United Kingdom. The problem which confronts the Government in this country is to organise the industries of an individualistic, non-military nation, a nation which has not yielded to its Government the same extensive powers of compulsion over individuals which the German Government is able to exercise.

The theory on which industrial mobilisation would be based in a country whose Government had no compulsory powers is somewhat as follows. The Government would invite manufacturers and others to supply the goods required, and would offer such a price for them as would call forth the requisite quantities of goods in the time fixed. The work of adjustment in regard both to labour and to plant would be thrown upon private enterprise. Meanwhile enlistment would take place from among those whose industrial services were not in great demand; men engaged on the manufacture of munitions and other equipment would be less likely to enlist, because they would know that their services were more valuable in industry than in the army, and because they would be earning high wages.

This theory of organisation, however, does not work satisfactorily in practice, especially when war is being waged on the present gigantic scale. So long as governments contract merely for small quantities of goods to be delivered more or less at leisure, competition may prevent the contractor from making an abnormal profit. But when governments become large purchasers of particular lines of goods they are apt to find themselves bargaining at a disadvantage. The army contractor has been a curse of belligerent governments from time immemorial. The result of pursuing ordinary methods of purchase at an extraordinary time has too often been that the Government obtains inferior goods at an exorbitant price. Producers of raw materials, manufacturers and middlemen of all kinds vie with one another in making money out of the public needs. So far as enlistment is concerned, experience has shown that the system under which the State accepts

for the armed forces every able-bodied man who volunteers does not produce perfect results. Men enlist who would be more usefully employed as industrial producers, and conversely men who would be less usefully employed as industrial producers do not enlist.

At the outbreak of the war the Government found it necessary to take control of the railway system, and an Order-in-Council was made on August 4th, in accordance with the Regulation of the Forces Act 1871, placing the control of the railways in the hands of an Executive Committee composed of general managers of the railways. The terms of compensation which it was agreed to pay to the companies were announced in the middle of September. It was arranged that the compensation to be paid shall be the sum by which the aggregate net receipts of the railways for the period during which the Government are in possession of them fall short of the aggregate net receipts for the corresponding period of 1913. If, however, the net receipts of the companies for the first half of 1914 are less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913, the sum payable is to be reduced in the same proportion. This sum, together with the net receipts of the railway companies taken over, is to be distributed amongst the companies in proportion to the net receipts of each company during the period with which comparison is made. A slight modification was subsequently introduced into the arrangement, according to which no reduction will be made if the net receipts for the first half of 1914 are less than the net receipts for the first half of 1913. Instead, the railway companies are to pay 25 per cent. of the war bonus granted by the Government to railway employees. It may incidentally be noted that the assumption by the Government of control over the railways has made it possible to dispense with the services of a large number of townsmen, canvassers, and agents, and to abolish the Railway Clearing House with its staff of over 700 clerks.

In addition to taking into its own hands the control of the railways and fixing terms of compensation, the Government requisitioned a great quantity of other means of transport soon after hostilities began. A large number of horses and motor vehicles were commandeered early in the war, the price paid to the owner being determined by the Government. Many ocean liners too were taken, to be converted into cruisers and patrol boats, and a large tonnage of shipping was impressed into government service as transports. In all these cases the terms offered as compensation have been lower than would have been paid for the same quantity in the open market, though probably, on the whole, not less than the price of the articles individually at the outbreak of war. Shipowners have complained loudly that the Government was paying less for their vessels than foreign governments or than

could be obtained from private charterers. It would, however, be obviously unfair to expect the Government, owing to its large requirements, to raise prices against itself. Moreover, in spite of, or perhaps in consequence of, the large tonnage taken over by the Government, shipowners as a whole have been able to exact extraordinarily high freights in their ordinary commercial business.

The policy of nationalisation has not yet been carried very far, and there are strong reasons (speaking merely from the point of view of efficiency and economy in war) for maintaining that it has not been carried far enough. Private individuals have been allowed to make huge fortunes out of the needs of the community. Merchants who had stocks of foodstuffs or raw materials have been able to sell out at high prices, and manufacturers and others who happened to possess the means of production required for producing commodities most urgently required have been permitted to "hold up" the community. If the available stocks of coal and the coal mining industry, the available stocks of grain and wool, and the woollen mills, had been treated in the same way as the railways, there is no doubt that fewer fortunes would have been made by private individuals, the Government would have spent less, and the distribution of wealth among the community would have been better than it is. No doubt there are many difficulties in the way of carrying out such a policy, even though nationalisation be only for the duration of the war. The public departments might be overstrained by having suddenly to undertake such a vast task, in the middle of a war. Moreover, whatever might have been done to limit the profits of merchants and manufacturers within the country, nothing, or at any rate very little, can be done in bringing pressure to bear upon those outside the United Kingdom. Producers of military requirements in America and other countries were bound to reap a rich harvest. It may also be argued that nationalisation is not the only way in which individuals can be prevented from squeezing the public purse; that it is quite feasible to secure for the community by taxation a large part of the exceptional war profits obtained by private individuals. Whether this is the case or not, there can be no doubt that these exceptional war profits are much impairing the efficiency of the country during the war. For the desire to realise special profits is infectious, so that a coalowner or woollen manufacturer who is in the process of making a fortune finds his employees naturally anxious to share his profits. Hence the unseemly strikes and squabbles which have broken out at various points of the industrial organism during the past few months.

There have recently been signs of a tendency to strengthen public control over some of the principal industries. The Government did, it is true, last autumn obtain powers under the Defence

of the Realm Act to take over and exercise control over works where war material was actually being produced. But little appears to have been done for some time. Recently, however, arrangements have been made for limiting the profits of some works manufacturing munitions of war. The Secretary to the Treasury on June 16 forecasted a Government Bill "for getting at the extra incomes made during the war and taxing them substantially." In March, the Government obtained powers in respect of works where war material was not actually being produced at the moment, but which were capable of being used for that purpose. In view of recent speeches by Ministers, and of the formation of a Ministry of Munitions whose special object is to supervise and promote the output of munitions, it may be expected that Government control over certain branches of industry will now be considerably strengthened.¹ Meanwhile the position as it affects labour is not being neglected. It appears that in the munitions industries recruiting has been carried too far. The intention of the Government appears to be to recall a considerable number of engineers from the forces, in addition to definitely prohibiting further recruiting of engineers. A departmental committee has recently also reported in favour of stopping recruiting among colliers. To put a stop to the practice which appears to have been common among firms engaged on government work of luring away one another's workpeople by promises of better wages, a remarkable Order-in-Council was issued at the end of April, making it an offence for employers in these industries to induce workmen of other firms on government work to leave their employment. The Order also prohibits employers engaged on government work from inducing anybody resident more than ten miles off to accept employment except through the agency of a Labour Exchange. It appears that a scheme is under consideration for prohibiting strikes and lock-outs in the munitions industries, disputes being submitted to compulsory arbitration. It is probable also that statutory force will be given to the promise made by the Government last March that at the end of the war Trade Union restrictions and working rules which have been suspended are to be reimposed precisely as before.

(d) AFTER THE WAR.

A word must be said in conclusion about the permanent effect likely to be produced by the war upon the economic organism. The matter is of course a question of pure speculation. Much depends on the duration of the war, the circumstances in which it

1. Since this article was written, the policy of the Government has been expressed in the Munitions Bill.

ends, and the skill and foresight with which economic adjustments during the period immediately after the war are effected.

It appears probable that there will be a permanent strengthening of the ties which unite the individual to the State, and the State to the individual. A powerful stimulus has been given to the individual consciousness of obligation to the State, and to the corresponding feeling that the individual has a right to expect reasonable conditions of life from the State. These ideas had been slowly developing before the war, and it seems likely that after the war they will exert a much more potent influence than ever before. Some further approach in the direction of what is vaguely called Socialism may be expected. It appears to be questionable whether the railways will ever be handed back to private enterprise. It is possible that the world of finance may be watched over more closely than before the war. The problem of securing a more efficient utilisation of the national resources is bound to call for more attention, and questions connected with the distribution of the national income will certainly not be neglected. The country will of course be saddled with a large national debt, while a large sum will have to be provided annually out of the public purse for pensions. But unless the political centre of gravity is shifted in an unexpected way, it appears reasonably certain that the principal burden of taxation will be thrust upon the wealthy classes. Broadly speaking the classes which are able to save money for investment in the war loans will be taxed to pay the interest and sinking fund of these loans. To this extent the service of the national debt will merely involve a readjustment of wealth among the relatively rich. The war, however, is bound to cause a loss of material capital, in addition to the terrible drain of personal capital to which the casualty lists bear witness; and this will react unfavourably upon the working classes. To counteract these losses it will be essential to check waste wherever it occurs, and to secure that the energy of the nation shall be more effectively applied in the processes of production. Rule of thumb methods and slovenly ways of thinking will have to go by the board; scientific training and organisation and education in the widest sense of the term will demand much greater attention than they have received hitherto. In this process the State organisation will doubtless play a leading part.

C. K. HOBSON.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY.

In the eyes of its early prophets Nationality was a principle either too holy to be analysed or too simple to require analysis. But that principle brought into the modern world new and insistent problems, and these cannot be understood, still less solved, without a scientific analysis of the meaning and character of nationality. The spirit of the scientist has become no less necessary than the spirit of the devotee—though, in this as in other things, that people is happiest which can best combine the two.

It is noteworthy that we often speak indifferently of "nationality" or of "consciousness of nationality." We speak of the "growth of nationality" when we mean that men become conscious (or more conscious) of some common quality or nature, and attain a conscious unity of life, a common inspiration and activity, on the basis of that recognition. Without this *recognition* of what is common, nationality cannot exist, or at any rate cannot work and live. It is therefore a first step in analysis to consider what those common factors are on the recognition of which nationality depends, to consider the *foundations* of nationality, as a pre-condition of any insight into its nature and working.

No quality or interest, however common, can be a basis of nationality unless it is regarded as common by those who possess it, and any quality or interest whatever, if so regarded, can be a basis of nationality. But we cannot therefore say simply that nationality depends on the recognition of common social qualities or interests. For we may not only fail to recognise factors of community which really exist, we may also "recognise" factors of community which have no reality beyond the recognition. Not all the foundations on which the structure of nationality rests are equally substantial. In particular the consciousness of race, at one time regarded as the corner-stone of nationality, has proved to be in nearly every case a delusion. But it is important to remember that the opposite error, the failure to recognise existing community, is far more common, and that all actual consciousness of community has some true basis, though it may not be that which it seems to have. Thus the consciousness of race is often a falsely simplified expression or reflection of the consciousness of nationality itself. Again, it is of the very essence of nationality that it rests on the consciousness of difference no less than on that of likeness. For each nationality is determined by contrast with others, and a

nationality regards itself not only as distinct from others, but nearly always as possessing some *exclusive* common qualities, being thereby separated from others as well as united within itself. Now what holds in respect of the recognition of likeness holds even more of the recognition of difference—the recognition may not always correspond with the reality. This is especially true of difference because as a general principle men assume difference until they are driven to recognise likeness. The whole history of society bears this out. Differences lie on the surface; likenesses have to be sought deeper.

The significance of these facts will be perceived when we have (1) set out the chief qualities or interests in the recognition of which, either as common or as exclusively common, the foundations of exclusive nationality lie, and (2) drawn up a table showing how far these various factors are actually united in particular instances of nationality. The chief qualities or interests in the recognition of which, either as common or as exclusively common, the foundations of nationality must be sought are these:—

- (1) Race.
- (2) Language.
- (3) Territory, *i.e.*, as occupied effectively, not as politically owned (7c).
- (4) Economic Interests.
- (5) Culture, *i.e.*, characteristic standards and modes of life.
- (6) Religion.
- (7) Political Unity.
- (7a) Political Tradition, outcome of (7) when long established.
- (7b) Political Subjection.
- (7c) Political Domination.

These factors are of course not wholly independent of one another, but they are all distinguishable, and are found variously combined and separated. Further, any or all of them may be common but not exclusive to a particular nationality or both common and exclusive. When a factor is both common and exclusive it may be regarded as a pure determinant of nationality and is then denoted by the figure I in the table which follows. When common (to the whole or the vastly greater part of a nationality) but not exclusive, it is denoted by X. Thus the English language is common to the English people, but not exclusive, being shared by the American people. In the case of territory, when a nationality occupies the whole of a definite area and is in no way territorially mingled with other nationalities we may likewise denote them by I; in all other cases we must denote

them by X. Thus nearly all imperial nations must be marked X. Again, when nation and state exactly coincide, we may represent the coincidence by the figure I under the factor of political unity; but when either a nationality is divided over more than one State, or a State includes more than one nationality, we must write X under the same factor in respect of any such nationality. For instance we must set X against this factor in the case of the American nation, since they have admitted negroes to their political rights. In the case of some other factors, and particularly of economic and cultural interests, it is or should be obvious that, especially in the world of civilisation, absolute objective demarcation as between nationalities is quite impossible. In the civilised world national differences, whatever they may amount to, are not differences in "culture-stage"—they are differences in the subtler group-qualities, differences of moods and manners and temperaments, not in the universal character of their standards and achievements. One nation excels in one art, another in another, one has a more favourable opportunity than another for some economic or scientific achievement, but no one possesses a unity of culture at once independent of and in every respect superior to that of others. But if a nationality is deeply conscious of its own culture as being unique, or if it is deeply conscious of the severance of its economic interests from those of its neighbours, we may, in terms of our previous definition, regard such cultural or economic interests as for it pure determinants. In the case of economic interests, this sense of absolute severance seems to occur in the modern world only under the coercive control of dominant over subject nationalities; and in fact it is clear in every case that political conditions, the establishment of tariff-walls, for example, largely determine both the unity and the separation of such interests.

Since we are concerned with the *consciousness* of common quality or interest, variety of opinion may exist in respect of particular items in the table which follows. I have taken various representative nationalities—the terms British, German, Russian, etc., referring to those and those only who are conscious of *being* British, German, Russian, etc., not to all comprised within, or possessing *legal* nationality (*i.e.*, merely political rights) within, the British or German or Russian Empire—and sought to show the factors on which they depend for unity. Being subjectively limited, these may vary somewhat from time to time—a state of war, in particular, intensifies the consciousness of common national qualities and may turn a normally imperfect determinant into an abnormally pure determinant. I have tried to represent the various factors as they are determinant of the normal consciousness of the respective nationalities.

TABLE SHOWING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY.

(I denotes a factor *recognized* as exclusively common; X a factor recognized as common but not exclusive; O denotes, in respect of any factor, that there is no community co-extensive with nationality; X+ denotes a near approach to I. The last column shows the "pure determinants.")

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(7a)	(7b)	(7c)	
British ...	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	I	O	I	(7a) (7c)
Americans ... (U.S.A.)	O	X	X	X	X	O	X	O	O	O	None
French ...	X	X	X+	X	X+	O	O	I	O	I	(7a) (7c)
Italians ...	X	X	X+	X	X	O	O	O	O	O	None certain
Russians ...	X	I	X	X	X+	O	X	I	O	I	(2) (7a) (7c)
Germans ...	X	X	X+	X	X+	O	X	O	O	I	(7c)
Jews	I	O	O	O	X	I	O	I?	I	O	(1) (6) (7b)
Japanese ...	I	I	I	X	X	O	I	I	O	?	(1) (2) (3) (7) (7a)
Spaniards...	I	X	I	X	X	X	I	I	O	O	(1) (3) (7) (7a)
Swiss	O	O	I	X	O	O	I	I	O	O	(3) (7) (7a)
Poles	I	I	I	X	X	X	O	I	I	O	(1) (2) (3) (7a) (7b)
Czechs ...	I	I	I	I	X	O	O	O	I	O	(1) (2) (3) (4) (7b)
Magyars ...	I	I	I	X	X	O	X	I	O	I	(1) (2) (3) (7a) (7c)

There is possible, we may repeat, a divergence of opinion in respect of particular items in the foregoing table, and there is sufficient heterogeneity within modern nations to make generalisation in respect of certain factors, *e.g.*, religion, always precarious; but the general result remains unaffected. A number of very significant conclusions may be drawn from the table. Here we must notice in particular that, for the various nationalities we have selected as representative, (1) there is no single factor present in *all* cases of the consciousness of nationality, (2) in no two cases are the factors on which this consciousness is based exactly the same, (3) it is not necessary for nationality that there should be any "pure determinant" whatever. It does not follow from the last-mentioned fact that nationalities need not represent distinct types. Thus there is undoubtedly an American nationality although there is no exclusive basis for it in the form of some *specific* common quality or interest. It does clearly follow, on the other hand, that nationality is not to be identified with any or all of its foundations, that it is something essentially psychical and necessarily indefinite, being a certain consciousness of likemindedness which may be developed in a great variety of ways and under a great variety of conditions. It is certain that in every case of the *formation* of nationality there must originally have been subjection to the two great formative influences of common social life and common environment. But there are all degrees of common life and there is generally continuity of environment, so that there are also all degrees of likemindedness. How then can we distinguish

that degree which makes nationality? It can be only in terms of the desire of a group for political unity, for a common (not necessarily exclusive) political organisation. The criterion is by its very nature imperfect, but no other seems available. If then any people who bear a common name do not, however scattered they may be, desire to share in a common political life, they may be conscious of common race, as perhaps Gipsies are, but they cannot be called conscious of common nationality. If it be true that the Jews (who are represented as a nation in the table above) have lost the desire of political reunion, then it may be said of them that they have lost the national self-consciousness, retaining the racial alone. If again a self-governing colony lacks the desire to be at least federated to the mother-country, it must be said of it that it has lost its original nationality and become a new nation.

Why is it that a community may waken, as it seems in a moment, to the consciousness of nationality? Why is it that the most diverse or opposite influences, the glory no less than the misery of a people, the desire for deliverance or the lust of domination, the materialism of the exploiter or the idealism of the orator and poet, can evoke or direct that spirit? Why is it that the sense of nationality expands, diminishes, or is transformed from time to time, and that the members of a nation may, having changed their sky, change also in time their essential nationality, as the Americans have done? Why is it that the spirit of nationality may be hailed as the liberator of the world, and that yet some profound minds can look upon it as an evil thing, whose course "will be marked by material and moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind." ?¹ And how must so ambiguous a spirit develop if it is to resolve the troubles which it brings no less than maintain the benefits which it can bestow?

We may find some help towards the solution of these questions in the analysis we have already made. The sentiment of nationality depends for its character on the character of its many and various foundations; it is transformed with the transformation of any or all of these; and it finds its true fulfilment when men recognise the true nature, the interdependence and co-ordination, and the rightful claims of these. This may be shown if we trace, though here it can be done only in the most meagre outline, the evolution of nationality. It is commonly said that the sentiment of nationality is a quite modern phenomenon; it would perhaps be more accurate to say that this sentiment has in modern days revealed itself in new and decisive forms. The process of its evolution, leading to these modern revelations of its power, is necessarily, in the universal

1. Acton, *History of Freedom*: Essay on Nationality.

interdependence of social factors, complex and hard to trace, but the main stages are sufficiently clear. They may be stated as follows:—

(1) There is a stage of society, before government has grown strong or any political fabric developed, when the group is held together by an intense and exclusive communal spirit, the spirit of the clan or, in a somewhat more developed society, the spirit of the tribe. A good instance of the working of the more primitive type may still be seen in the institutions of such simple peoples as the Veddah groups. Here the group-consciousness is wholly isolated. "Most clans [a clan consisting of merely two or three families sharing a single cave or meeting on one hunting ground] have only a dim idea of the bare existence of others, and in consequence there is no question of marriage outside the clan, which is so common a feature of the next higher stage of development."¹ To the clan-limited consciousness even the tribe, as a union of clans, is a circle too vast to be one inclusive community, and here, as always, the limit of community is the limit of the intelligence of its members. It is noteworthy that these wretched Veddahs, who cannot even count and have no names for days or months, yet regard themselves as vastly superior to all outside the group.²

It is rare to find a clan-limited consciousness of this type, but the tribe-limited consciousness is the commonest of phenomena in primitive life. Here again the consciousness of community rests upon a number of factors regarded as all common and all exclusive. It is not that kinship determines the tribe, *or* religion, *or* tradition.³ Locality, kinship, religion, tradition, customary law, perhaps also communal ownership, together weave the magic circle which bounds protection, service, and fellowship. To belong to the tribe means to belong to the kin, to worship the tribal gods, to be initiated into the tribal institutions, to have the same friends and foes, the same interests, the same thoughts, as all the tribe. In the analysis of such a community it is necessary to set I under all the factors of community. The primitive tribe is a circle wherein universal uniformity is the absolute condition of exclusive devotion.

(2) But all development is achieved at the cost of uniformity, at the cost of the simplicity of old allegiances. The development of society implied in the first place the growth of the institution of

1. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, on the Rock-Veddahs as described by the Herrn Sarasin.

2. Cf. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, ii, pp. 170 ff., for other illustrations of this attitude among primitive peoples.

3. The false simplification due to regarding any one factor, as, for instance, Maine and Bagehot regarded kinship, as the sole or even primary determinant of early communities is well pointed out by Westermarck, *op. cit.*, ii, cc. xxxiii and xxxiv.

government and created a new devotion that at first may have seemed identical with, but in time revealed itself as distinct from and on occasion contradictory to, the old—the “loyalty” of the subject to the ruler, the chief, the government, the dynasty, as distinct from the devotion of the tribesman to his whole tribe, of the citizen to his country. “For chief and tribe,” “for king and country,” made an easy and inspiring phrase, but the identity of service implied in the phrase was by no means always a reality. The new sentiment was greatly fostered by militarism and by the alternative consequences of militarism, victory or defeat, domination or subjection. Victory enhanced the power and glory of the ruler, defeat revealed the more the necessity of his strength. The same influences developed the distinction of class from class within the community, and created conditions under which the opposition of classes—which came, and still comes, very near to being an opposition of subject classes and governing classes—broke finally the homogeneity of the tribal life. Thus was born in every developing community a long period of confused and crossing loyalties which men sought, often vainly, to harmonise or identify. It might be shown, were it not for the limits of an article, how the confusion became intensified when different associations began to appear in their distinctness from the State and, in the name of the specific interest for which each stood, to make claims contradictory to those of the State—or rather of the actual governments of existing states—on the common members of both. Thus in particular the conflict of religions which followed the Reformation created also the antithesis of Church and State, and so introduced a new and profound disturbance of the old unity of communal devotion, just as the trade-union is to-day creating a newer and, as it may prove in the end, no less profound a disturbance. It is not suggested that these great disturbing principles have come like serpents into the Eden of a primitive life. Primitive Edens are really very wretched affairs, and the seeming serpent may reveal itself as the deliverer of social man, in showing him the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. In the Western world the culmination of the confusion of loyalties was reached under Feudalism.

(3) The sentiment of nationality proper emerged when men again sought, under the conditions just described, to realise and distinguish the claims of the complete community to which they felt themselves to belong, discerning this devotion from other conflicting loyalties. It is not to be supposed that this new development was in its turn due to simple or merely “ideal” motives, though we cannot here delay to consider this question. But the desire for the political freedom of the nation was the dominant motive which gave strength and direction to the senti-

ment of nationality, as could easily be demonstrated by an account of the historical circumstances under which that sentiment arose. The two great political developments of modern days, the growth of nationality and the growth of democracy, have thus a common principle, or rather they reveal the same principle working under different conditions. (a) On the one hand, when a community which feels itself one is either parcelled out between several governments or is in whole or in part subject to what it regards as alien domination, there arises the nationalist claim proper, the demand of a nation not so much for self-government as for a government of its own. (b) On the other hand, when a nation already possesses, as a whole, a government of its own, just the same principle is now revealed in the completer demand of democracy. Nationalism is the spirit of protest against political domination, the impulse to that free national unity which itself is the foundation on which the common interests of the nation must be achieved. To attain the demand of nationalism is not to achieve these interests, it is to have built the foundation only of their achievement. Nationality is not the end but the beginning.

Hence we have to realise very carefully the limits of the ideal of nationality. It is the failure to realise these limits which perverts that ideal from a savour of life into a savour of death. *Nationality can be a true ideal only so long as and in so far as nationality itself is unrealised.* As soon as it is attained, as soon as a nation is a unity free from alien domination, a new ideal must take its place. The ideal must now be to realise, on the basis of nationality, the interests of the nation—and that ideal must be sought in other ways, for though nation is marked off from nation the *interests* of one nation are not, as we have seen, similarly marked off from those of others. The preliminary idea of nationality, the establishment of the autonomous nation-state, is sought through difference; the ideals of the enfranchised nationality must, in view of the interdependence of the interests of nations, be sought through co-ordination and intercommunity.

Nationality provides an adequate ideal only while men are seeking liberty from alien political control. That ideal is, until that attainment, certainly of all ends the most imperative and most fundamental, for the attainment of a true basis of common action is the necessary pre-condition of the realisation of common good. But when an ideal is achieved it is vain to regard it as any longer an ideal. When national liberty is achieved, the true inspiration of nationality is fulfilled, except in so far as it is necessary to maintain what has been attained—but no community can live merely to maintain its foundations, it necessarily builds upon these. If on the attainment of the claim of nationality no further ideal emerges, then nationalism moves rapidly to the corrupt extreme of

chauvinism. It was so in the case of revolutionary France, it has obviously been so in the case of many present-day nations. But chauvinism is the spirit in which one nationality exalts itself at the cost of others—in the long run at the cost of itself. That it is at the cost of itself is clear enough when we remember how many interests of present-day nations have ceased to be exclusive to each. In so far as interests are exclusive, the interests of each are independent of those of others; in so far as they are non-exclusive, the interests of all are interdependent, and what injures those of one injures also those of others.

(4) The slow recognition of interdependence and its consequences, slow especially as compared with that rapid growth of interdependence which the scientific development of the means of communication has ensured, has been leading towards a new stage in the evolution of nationality. It has been making modern nations, almost against their wills, or at any rate the wills of their governments, parts of a greater society, partners in a common interest. It has been breaking down the idea that nationality must be fostered in exclusiveness, an idea no less absurd than the supposition that the character of an individual must be fostered in isolation. Nationality is no more obliterated by international relations than personality is by interpersonal, *i.e.*, social, relations. On the contrary, the current of social intercourse brings psychical stimulus to the nation no less than to the individual, as the whole history of civilisation reveals. Again, the development of international interests has been making inter-state co-ordination necessary and inevitable. But the two methods along which this has been pursued have proved hopelessly inadequate. The one method consists in special conventions and agreements in respect of particular questions, such as the international agreements in respect of passenger and freight transportation by land and sea, of post and telegraph, of patent and copyright, finally—and on these it is that governments have ironically lavished their greatest care!—on the rules of war itself. The other method consists in the system we call diplomacy, this fragile bond of connection, the breaking of which means so much, being the only definitely constituted relation between modern States. Whatever views we may hold as to the relative services and disservices of secret diplomacy, it is surely difficult to maintain that any such system can be an adequate organ of the inter-community of States.

The future of the nations of Europe, for a long time to come, will be decided by their ability to see past the accumulated hatreds and losses, tragedies and terrors, of this almost universal war, to the necessity of establishing some saner system, some international organisation as permanent and as extensive as the common interests of the nations. There are many and great difficulties to be over-

come in the realisation of such an end, but there is only one final difficulty, the refusal of men to will the end. Its realisation is Utopian only so long as men think it so.

If men cannot or will not advance to intrinsic ends—to the deeper level of common interests where they face the same problems, the same needs, the same destinies—they must pursue extrinsic ends. If the nations are not joined by the deeper common interests they are set against one another by their narrower differences; if they do not strive towards those common possessions that form abiding satisfactions they must wrest miserably from one another those most partial goods which one or another can still exclusively enjoy.

Because all civilised peoples pursue ends which are essentially common no one can really love his own people who really hates another. If he seem to, unless his hate be mere ignorance, yet he loves in her only what is external, superficial, picturesque, only what serves his *amour propre*, immediate comfort, or personal interest, for he loves only that which separates her from others, disregarding the deeper good which unites. In the light of this truth we may surely say, modifying Browning's phrase, How little they love England who only England love! If only, when the time comes, the nations, standing among the ruins of war, could be made to understand the significance of this truth, it would mean the commencement of a happier civilisation as well as of a new stage in the evolution of nationality.

R. M. MACIVER.

WAR AND INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY.

THE aim of this essay is to raise the question whether the science of Psychology can ever shew us how to abolish War. It is a question that must have occurred to many of those who have been able to reflect on the events of the past months, and it is one of the most far-reaching questions that mankind as a whole has to face, one on which its future may to a great extent depend. We are beginning to realise as never before—for it is to be supposed that at the time of other cataclysms, such as during the destruction of the Roman Empire, mankind was less conscious of itself than now—how powerful is the check that War may impose on the advance of civilisation, and the sight, together with the accompanying horrors, has naturally stimulated the desire, always widespread even in times of peace, to devise if possible a means of surmounting this formidable obstacle.

This desire has already manifested itself in the formulation of many schemes, mainly legal and political—from systems of international policing to conventions for compulsory arbitration—and the evidently unworkable nature of these may be taken as a measure of the emotional pressure that has brought them into being. It is characteristic of emotional states that they lead to attempts at immediate action instead of to thought, the preliminary investigation necessary to secure suitable action being dispensed with. The general attitude of pacifists is that, both on the moral and the material side, the evils of war are evidently greater than its benefits, even if the latter are admitted, and that consequently steps must be taken at all costs to prevent its occurrence. The sense of urgency is felt so acutely that any calm study of the factors involved is regarded as an intolerable delay, while any expression of doubt as to the desirability of the goal is repudiated with impatience. Ill-considered and, in all probability, unsuccessful action is the natural result of such an attitude. Certain cooler-headed and more thoughtful people, on the other hand, who take a longer view of the question, realise better its complexity, and see that the matter demands an intimate knowledge of human motives, desires and emotions. They therefore turn to Psychology for assistance in a problem which obviously belongs to its domain, and ask psychologists how it is to be solved. It is the purpose of the present essay to consider what kind of answer can be given to such an inquiry.

Now this answer must always be the same whenever any science is approached with a similar question, one with a purely utilitarian

aim. Suppose, for example, that an engineer is asked to devise a plan for carrying out a given practical purpose, *e.g.*, building a bridge. He can answer the questions as to the possibility of the undertaking, the means that would have to be adopted, and the probable cost, in lives and money, that would be incurred. What would not be in his sphere is the question of whether or no the undertaking *ought* to be entered upon. All he can do is to supply the data relating to the points just mentioned, leaving to the promoters of the undertaking the decision as to whether they considered it worth while to carry it out. Science is thus the handmaid of the human will: it is not within her province to dictate what ought to be done in a given situation, but only to point out what will have to be done if a desired end is to be attained.

Psychology, however, holds a peculiar rank among the sciences in that it is concerned also with the instrument of valuation, the mind. When approached with a utilitarian problem, therefore, it has two additional functions to fulfil which do not appertain to any other science. In supplying the data to enable a decision to be made it has first to answer the three questions mentioned above, *viz.*, as regards possibility, means, and cost. But there are two further sets of important data that Psychology has to supply. The first of these relates to the decision that a given end must be achieved, the second to the choice of means. Fundamentally the two points come to the same, it being the place of Psychology in both cases to call attention to the mental factors that may unconsciously influence decision, so that they may be taken into consideration in making a judgement. This is a matter on which the greatest emphasis has to be laid, because the importance of such factors is commonly neglected or else grossly underestimated, and it will therefore be discussed here at some little length. Coming now to the question at issue, whether Psychology can teach us how to abolish war, we see that the first thing to do is to re-state the problem under the following headings: Is it possible? If so, how can it be done? What would the cost involve? And, finally, what is the full significance of the desire to accomplish this end?

It may as well be said at once that Psychology can as yet give no positive answer to any one of these questions, a fact which for the impatient will forthwith dispose of any further interest in whatever it may have to say on the matter. With those, however, who are chary of nostrums, and brave enough to suspend their judgement until the painful process of attaining truth is achieved, the following considerations should carry weight. In the first place, Psychology is already in a position to offer a considerable body of information directly bearing on the problem, and, in the second place, it is only through a richer and deeper knowledge of Psychology that a final solution of it is possible. It is hardly

likely that this conclusion will be doubted on reflection, for it should be evident that even physical factors, *e.g.*, economic ones, owe their influence only to the effect they have on human motives and instincts: it is in the sphere of these latter that we have to seek in order to obtain a better understanding of the causes of War.

It will be expedient to open the discussion by considering further the important matter mentioned above, namely, the influence of emotional factors on decision and judgement. Within the last twenty years a method of investigation, known as psycho-analysis, has been devised and elaborated by Professor Freud of Vienna, which has permitted access to a hitherto veiled part of the mind, designated the Unconscious, and the explorations thus carried out have yielded information of very considerable value as to the unsuspected significance of this more emotional region of the mind. It would appear from these investigations that man is endowed with a far more intense emotional nature than is generally imagined, and that powerful barriers exist the function of which is to restrain its manifestations. All the emotions of which we become aware, either in ourselves or in others, represent only tricklings through from the volcanic reservoir that is pent up in the unconscious region of the mind, *i.e.*, that region of which we are unconscious. The dams that impede a freer flow of emotion are the restrictions against uncurbed action that have been painfully acquired during the civilisation of the race and the training of the individual, and the reason for their existence is the fact that the pent-up or "repressed" emotional life is of a rude and savage character incompatible with the demands of civilised standards. In this buried mental life, which is prevented from readily translating itself into action, phantasies play a very extensive part, and these are fundamentally of a pleasurable kind. Any disagreeable piece of reality that may succeed in penetrating to this region of the mind is at once treated as material to be used for the building up of some pleasurable fancy; it is remoulded in terms of some wish, and thus robbed of all its unpleasant features. The Unconscious cannot endure any contradiction of its desires and imaginings, any more than an infant can; intelligibly so, because it mainly comprises the infantile and inherited portion of our mind. Perception and, in an even higher degree, judgement are thus grossly distorted by these powerful emotional agents.

We are, it is true, to some extent familiar with this process of distortion in conscious mental life also. The expression "the wish is father to the thought" is proverbial, and everyone will admit, in the abstract, that prejudices can influence opinions and judgements, at least of other people. The science of History, and in a very imperfect way that of Law, makes some attempt at estimating and allowing for errors due to this factor, and in scientific research

it is generally recognised that evidence of an emotional influence (jealousy, ambition, etc.) casts suspicion on the validity of the conclusions and even on that of the observations. But what is not generally recognised is that influences of this nature are far more extensively exerted than might be imagined, and that the most potent ones are those proceeding from sources of which we know nothing, namely from the unconscious region of the mind. In an emotional situation, such as is evoked by a horror of war, any judgement arrived at will infallibly be dependent only in part on the external evidence; in a greater part on unconscious emotional influences. If, therefore, we desire to form a judgement purely on the relevant evidence, *i.e.*, a judgement that is in accord with reality and so is likely to be permanent, it is essential to neutralise the influence of those other factors, and this, of course, cannot be done until it is known precisely what they are. As will presently be explained, this knowledge can be adequately based only on a study of Individual Psychology.

Similar considerations apply to the causes of war. The causes of any given war are exceedingly numerous, and these are usually so inter-related as to make the unravelling of them one of the most difficult of tasks; it is further notorious that success in this undertaking is rarely more than approximate. The most important part of the task is, of course, not the mere enumeration of a list of causes, but the ordering of them according to their scale of values. They constitute a hierarchy in this respect, and may be divided into the exciting causes, which merely precipitate the war, and the deeper or more underlying ones, which bear the main responsibility for it. Whereas popular opinion concentrates its attention almost exclusively on the former, the philosophic historian seeks to uncover and comprehend the latter. How difficult this is may be judged from the circumstance alone that it takes about a century before all the material is published on which valid conclusions can be founded. In the present war, for example, it would seem impossible as yet to answer even the apparently elementary and simple question as to which was the more important causative factor leading up to it—the so-called inevitable conflict between Teuton and Slav or the need for German expansion overseas; in other words, whether the war is primarily one between Germany and Russia or between Germany and England.

Supposing, however, that all the political factors bringing about a certain war have been elucidated, we are still left with the problem of the causation of war in general. That is to say, the question arises whether there is not in the human mind some deep need, or some set of recurrently acting agents, which tends to bring about wars more or less regularly, and to find or create pretexts for wars whatever the external situation may be. This would involve the

conclusion that man cannot live for more than a certain period without indulging his warlike impulses, and that history comprises an alternation of wars and recuperations. Another possibility, not identical with the preceding, though allied to it, is that man tends to prefer the solution of various socio-political problems by means of war to their solution in any other way: this might be because of the instinct just referred to or else because the other solutions are more difficult and irksome, or it might be due to both reasons combined. There is undoubtedly much that could be adduced in favour of this view, unpalatable as it may seem, and we should be prepared in any unbiassed investigation for the possibility that it is true. We have, for instance, the unvarnished fact that wars do invariably recur in spite of the best intentions to the contrary, and it might very plausibly be argued that what happens historically is a periodic outburst of warlike impulses followed by a revulsion against war—usually lasting for one or two generations—which is again succeeded by a forgetting of the horrors involved and a gradually accumulating tension that once more leads to an explosion. This feature of periodicity would be well worthy of a special study,¹ but we must leave aside here historical questions of a kind which are not directly germane to the psychological considerations of the present paper.

Returning to the problem of the psychology of war, we may at this point consider an objection that is likely to be brought against the mode of approach here adopted, namely, that of Individual Psychology. Many will take the view that, since war is obviously a social problem, it should be to either Sociology or Social Psychology that we should have recourse in order to obtain a better understanding of the nature of it. This might even more strongly be urged in the case of modern war, which is essentially the affair of whole societies, and in which the social phenomena of imitation, contagion, crowd psychology, and mass suggestion play an important part. Fully to meet this objection would necessitate a detailed discussion, impossible here, of the relation of Social to Individual Psychology in general. There are two schools of thought in the matter, the main point at issue being as follows: On the one hand it is contended that it is possible to pursue the subject of Social Psychology independently of the data afforded by Individual Psychology, on the ground that there are data pertaining to the interaction of social mass units which are provided by the former subject and which are accessible only to those who

1. Several writers, for example, have commented on the interesting circumstance that on the four last occasions the turn of the century has roughly coincided with a general European war of the same nature, consisting, namely, in a coalition against the predominance of the most powerful nation.

make a study of it. The second school maintain the contrary of this, namely, that Social Psychology must throughout be based on Individual Psychology, for three reasons. In the first place, the unconscious emotional influences and prejudices spoken of above affect judgement to a much greater extent in the domain of the mental than in that of the non-mental sciences, so that a student of Social Psychology is at a grave disadvantage unless he has on the basis of Individual Psychology submitted his own mind to a thorough analysis and in this way acquired a knowledge and control of the distorting influences in question. In the second place, the study of motives, emotions, instincts, etc., can for technical reasons be properly carried out only by the methods of Individual Psychology, where the material is susceptible of objective experimental control. Finally, there is good reason to believe that in what may be called the "social situations" that are the subject of social-psychological study no new factor is added that may not be observed apart from such situations. "Social" mental activities are nothing more nor less than the sum of individual mental activities. The reason for this has been pointed out by Wilfred Trotter,¹ who in his essay on the most exquisite of socio-psychological forces—the herd instinct—adduced considerations to shew that man is literally never anything but a social animal, and that all the agents specially insisted on by social psychologists, mob infection, press suggestion, etc., are constantly operative under all circumstances. The reason why some social psychologists have been misled into adopting the opposite conclusion is largely that the manifestations of certain instincts acted on by "social situations" may differ somewhat in their external form from those occurring apart from these situations, the underlying unity of the two sets being thus overlooked.

Something may profitably be said at this point on the mode of operation of these "social situations," for the matter has a direct bearing on the problem of the essential nature of war. It is necessary to recur to a topic mentioned earlier, that of the "repressed" unconscious impulses that are incompatible with civilised standards of thought and behaviour. The normal fate of these impulses is not annihilation, as might be supposed from the fact of their total disappearance from view in the course of education and development. On the contrary, they remain active throughout life, and furnish probably the greater part of all our interest, energies, and strivings. They cannot manifest themselves, however, unless they first go through a process of transformation, to which the name "sublimation" has been attached, whereby the energy investing them becomes diverted along other, associated channels that accord

1. *Sociological Review*, 1908.

better with the demands of social standards. The deflection of an ungratified maternal instinct into philanthropic channels is a familiar instance of this. Mental disorder, including the various forms of "nervousness," results from an inability of this process to work smoothly, and the very great prevalence of this in one shape or another, from slight eccentricities and character anomalies to the gravest kinds of insanity, affords some measure of the imperfection of the sublimating mechanism. Further, there is present in the mind a constant tendency to relapse in the direction of cruder and more primitive manifestations of the repressed impulses, and advantage is taken of every excuse to do so: examples are the relaxation of standards of modesty in clothing at the seaside and on the stage, the conduct responsible for the recent agitation about "war babies," and the temporary paralysis of ethical restraints by alcohol. Now the influence of social situations is very apt to be in just this direction of undoing the effects of sublimation, thus leading to the adoption of a lower or more primitive standard of behaviour.¹ A mild example of this may be seen in the circumstance that most committees will display types of behaviour, involving perhaps injustice, meanness, inconsiderateness, and lack of responsibility, of a kind that would be disavowed by any single member acting independently. The bloodthirsty and often indiscriminate cruelty of mobs is notorious, and in general it may be said that any large body of men can be got to commit acts that would be impossible to the component individuals. But it is important to realise that this massive social contact creates none of these impulses; it only releases them, by affording a certain sanction to them. The impulses themselves are deeply rooted in human nature, and lead to endless other manifestations besides those just indicated. These fall into three main groups: (1) social, those of social value, produced by sublimation; (2) asocial, those of no social value, neurotic and other mental disturbances, due to a partial failure of the sublimating process, *i.e.*, to mental conflict; (3) anti-social, due to paralysis of sublimation, whether this be brought about by massive social contact or in any other of the numerous ways in which this is possible. The manifestations of social situations so largely studied by social psychologists must, therefore, in no sense be regarded as isolated phenomena.

It is from this point of view that we obtain what is perhaps the

1. The reason why the influence of social situations is most often in the direction of lowering the standards of thought and behaviour can only be briefly indicated here. It is because sublimations are mainly individual creations, whereas the unconscious repressed impulses are more uniformly and generally distributed; a relapse therefore takes place in the direction of the greatest common measure of the whole, *i.e.*, in the direction of these impulses.

most profitable perspective of the nature of war. The essence of war surely consists in an abrogation of standards of conduct approved of by the ethical sense of civilised communities. By this is meant that in war an attempt is made to achieve a given purpose by means which are otherwise regarded as reprehensible. The best proof of this statement is to be found in the simple fact that no nation or government dares to assume the responsibility for initiating any war. At the present time, for instance, they are one and all engaged in an eager search for sanctions to justify their action in proceeding to war, and a cynical observer might almost say that the chief conflict in the war is over the question of who began it. On every side it is agreed that to have caused the war is a disgrace, the blame for which must at all costs be imputed to the enemy. To admit responsibility for it is universally regarded as tantamount to a confession of guilty wrong-doing, the thought of which is too painful to tolerate. Every nation whole-heartedly maintains the view that it was forced to go to war, regretfully and entirely against its will, by the wicked machinations of some other nation. Now this is just the attitude which in private life we see adopted towards any anti-social act or any act of which the ethical sense of the community does not approve. The person concerned makes every endeavour to shift his guilt or responsibility on to others or on to circumstances, and seeks to defend his conduct under cover of all imaginable excuses, pretexts, and rationalisations. This need for defence is in itself a proof that the act runs counter to the prevailing ethical sense. Seen from this angle, peace may be compared with the institution of monogamy, which society accepts in theory, but never in practice.

It is plain that the actual deeds of which war consists are so counter to the conscience of mankind that they can never be deliberately performed without some preliminary vindication; otherwise it would be mere murder and destruction of the savagest kind. The general theory of war is, of course, that the deeds comprising it are in themselves wholly repellent and abhorrent, but that they are justified by the necessity or desirability of the purpose to be achieved. As was indicated above, however, an alternative and equally possible view is that the repressed impulses leading to warlike acts accumulate such force from time to time as to incline the scales in favour of a bellicose solution whenever the opportunity offers itself in the form of problems otherwise difficult of settlement. Nietzsche, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, contrasts the two attitudes thus: "Ye say it is the good cause which halloweth even war? I say unto you: it is the good war which halloweth every cause." The fact that the second view appears repugnant and almost unthinkable is in itself no evidence against its possible truth, for *ex hypothesi* it relates to the unconscious and repressed

part of the mind, the part that is repudiated by our waking consciousness, but which none the less exerts the greatest influence on the latter. It is not without significance that every belligerent tends to impute to his enemy this motive for war; the Germans have a proverb *Der Hass sieht scharf*, which means that hate enables one to uncover the motives of an enemy to which the latter is blind.

Even if we accept the more flattering view of war, to the effect that "the end justifies the means," it is necessary to remember that historically the attitude of mind implied in this has frequently been allowed to serve as a cover for acts in which the means supplied the principal motive—a familiar instance being the passion for cruelty indulged in under the cloak of the Inquisition. It is an empirical rule of wide validity in psychology that the consequences of an act, so far as they could have been predicted, have to be taken into account as a probable motive, and usually the chief one, in performing the act, even when the author of it repudiates this conclusion. Applying this rule to the present question, we are led to ask whether the terrible events of war, the cruelties and so forth, are not connected with the underlying causes of war itself. Therefore, for more reasons than one, it remains a problem for psychological investigation whether the end or the means of war must be regarded as the ultimate cause of it. There is reason to suppose that both are operative, and also that the second set of factors is seriously underestimated, but it would be valuable to know which of the two is the more important. It will thus be necessary to institute studies into two broad groups of motives, on the one hand those alleged by the conscience and on the other the darker ones to be discovered only by a more indirect mode of approach. A few words may be added concerning each of these groups, so as to indicate some of the directions in which further research would seem to be desirable.

Most of the motives belonging to the first group can be summed up under the word patriotism, for it is much to be doubted whether the operations of cosmopolitan financiers have ever directly dictated the outbreak of any war and they have rarely been a factor of any importance at all. Patriotism, or devotion, love and loyalty towards one's country (or smaller unit), involves the willingness to fight for its interests, this taking the various forms of defending its material interests, avenging a slight on its honour, extending its prestige and importance, or resisting encroachments. The ultimate psychological origin of this complex sentiment is to be found mainly in the individual's relation to his parents, as Bacon hinted in his remark that "Love of his country begins in a man's own house."¹ It has three sources—in feelings about the self, the mother, and the

1. *De Aug. Scient.*, Bk. vi, Ch. iii.

father respectively. The last-mentioned is probably the least important of the three, but is more prominent in some cases than in others, leading then to a patriarchal conception in which the head of the state is felt to be the father, and the state itself the father's land. More significant is the relation towards the mother, as is indicated by the fact that a country is as a rule conceived to have the feminine gender (in the expression *la patrie* we see a fusion of both conceptions). Most important of all is the source in self-love and self-interest, where the self becomes more or less identified with one's fellow citizens and the state is a magnified self. Psycho-analysis has shewn that these three feelings are far more complex and deeply rooted than is generally supposed, and that they exert a correspondingly weighty influence in the most manifold relations of life, often in quite unsuspected ways. On the precise fate of these feelings during the stage of early mental development depends the greater part of a man's character, dispositions, including the form of his patriotism, whether aggressive, assertive, vainglorious, or the contrary; it would be tempting to compare the type of patriotism usual in different countries with the various types of family relationship characteristic of each, for instance in Germany, England, and America. Even the finer shades of conduct in diplomatic relations, and the decisions on intricate questions, are to a large extent determined by the precise manner in which the three feeling-complexes just mentioned have been developed and inter-connected; it should not be forgotten that the greater part of them is unconscious, an example being the concealed hostility towards the father and passion for the mother that makes up what has been called the Oedipus complex.

The second group of motives concerns a darker side of human nature. It is necessary to penetrate behind a veil which is well adapted to obscure it. This is the veil of restraint and discipline, the inculcation of obedience, loyalty, and devotion to the military unit and its commander, attitudes of mind which are akin to the first group of motives just discussed; they can hardly be regarded as important causes of war, for the emotions concerned are just as easily indulged in times of peace. Behind the façade, however, are to be discerned evidences of far less respectable motives. War is, of course, the replacement of peaceful methods of dealing with certain other people, through discussion, consideration, and so on, by the method of brute force, and that this reversion to a more primitive level of civilisation is of its very essence is shewn by the nature of the deeds that throughout compose it. Civilised warfare is a contradiction in terms, for under no circumstances is it a civilised act to blow another person's head off or to jab a bayonet into him, nor can we after recent events be any longer subject to the illusion that it is possible to exclude savagery from the warfare

of civilised nations. Four repressed instincts play a cardinal part in all war: the passions for cruelty, destruction, lust, and loot. It is popularly held that the manifestations of these are incidental to war, and not inherent in it; that they are regrettable, though perhaps unavoidable, complications which should be reduced to a minimum. But it is found in practice that where one of these passions is suppressed another flames out the more to take its place; one army may rape where the other loots. The most puritanical army of which we have record, Cromwell's Ironsides, indulged in orgies of sacrilege, pillage, and massacre—under, of course, the usual cover of military necessity, etc. One of these passions, the lust to kill, is so indispensable that without it an army would be paralyzed. The full analysis of these various passions, the sadistic blood-lust, the impulse to pillage and destroy, and so on, is of obvious importance for a proper understanding of their significance in regard to both the causation and conduct of war.

Where, therefore, the romantic idealist sees only the pure flame of patriotism feeding noble impulses to heroism and self-sacrifice, the psychologist detects the operation also of deeper forces dating from a past that is only too imperfectly overcome. Behind the guise of altruism work impulses of a more egoistic order, and who shall say which of the two is the more important, the visible or the invisible? What can definitely be asserted is that there is no hope of attaining to a real understanding of the meaning of war unless both are taken into full account and appraised at their true value. Whoever undertakes a psycho-analysis of men deciding to enlist in war time will be astonished at the complexity and strength of the unavowed motives darkly impelling him and reinforcing his altruism, from the fascinating attraction of horrors to the homosexual desire to be in close relation with masses of men, and one can only urge scepticism and caution in accepting conclusions on these and allied matters until our knowledge of every layer of the human mind is more complete than it is at present.

It may also be not out of place to sound a warning for those who accept the view that war is a reversion to a more savage state of conduct, but who draw the inference that the way to avoid it is through a still greater repression of the more primitive instincts that we inherit from the past. Doubt is cast on the validity of this apparently plausible conclusion by the following considerations. The investigations of psycho-analysis¹ have shewn that the influence on conscious life of these impulses that are in a repressed state in the unconscious mind is of an altogether unsuspected importance, and, what is more, that they are indestructible.

1. Those wishing to inform themselves further on this subject may be referred to the writer's *Papers on Psycho-Analysis*, 1913.

Through the process of sublimation, however, they become of the highest value in furnishing much of the energy for our social activities, so that the only hope of diminishing their anti-social effects is to further this process. Now sublimation takes place automatically when repression is carried up to a certain point, the repressed impulses finding another outlet. In this there is necessarily an element of renunciation (of the original aim of the impulse), a circumstance which imposes an inevitable limit on what is possible in this direction. There are not wanting indications suggesting that we are nearly reaching the limit of natural sublimation, and when this happens there comes about a very unsatisfactory state of affairs. If, namely, repression is carried too far, the energies in question revert to their unconscious sources, and lead either to neurotic disorders or to an accumulated tension which may be followed by an outbreaking of the impulses in more or less their original form. A lessening of the repression in such a case will allow better sublimation to take place than before.

If the present situation of civilisation is accurately described in these terms, it follows that there are only two possible ways of dealing further with these unruly impulses, and it is likely that both will be adopted when such matters are better understood. One is to relax the repression at points where it has lost its value and become harmful; certain aspects of the sex problem (more intelligent organisation of the marriage institution) occur to one in this connection. This is like the plan which we, alone among the nations, have adopted in the governing of subject races, and still more so in our relations with the Colonies. What the opposite attitude leads to is well shewn historically by the French Revolution and the American War of Independence. This principle has also been adopted socially in many spheres, notably in that of penology, and always ultimately with beneficial results. The other plan, which is not only compatible with, but also related to the first, consists in preventing excessive repression by allowing children to be more aware of certain sides of their nature, and so substituting conscious control for blind repression. A corollary of this is the provision of suitable outlets for the impulses in question; the value of various sports in this connection is undoubtedly great. One of the appeals made by war is that it offers a permissible outlet for a variety of impulses that are insufficiently gratified in times of peace; this is often described as the spirit of adventure seeking to escape from humdrum conventionality. The credit of first clearly perceiving that war could never be abolished unless suitable outlets were provided for the impulses leading to it belongs to William James. In his famous essay on "The Moral Equivalents of War" he suggested that such impulses should be deliberately guided into suitable paths, an example he gave being Alpine climbing to

gratify the desire for danger. What was completely lacking in his day, however, was any knowledge of the springs of conduct and of the unconscious sources of warlike impulses. Thanks to Freud's penetrating researches, we are now at least in a position to undertake further investigations in this direction that hold out every promise of success.

The argument of this paper may now be recapitulated. It is the place of Psychology to point out the almost irresistible tendency of the mind to believe that a given aim is possible of achievement when there is present a burningly intense desire to achieve it. Under these circumstances the mind tends greatly to underestimate the difficulties in the way, and also the cost involved. Psychology has further to ascertain what this judgement of values depends on and ultimately signifies. When all the data involved are put before those who have to pass such judgements it is quite possible that reflection may lead to reconsideration of the criteria on which there had been a tendency to make a hurried decision.

Although these considerations are evident enough, psychological knowledge has realised that it is far harder to apply them than is commonly imagined, and proffers the explanation of this, namely, that the main influences distorting judgement are unconscious ones, the persons concerned being therefore unaware of their effect. This matter has a direct bearing on judgements relating to the causation and preventibility of war. It is at present quite an open question whether it is possible for mankind to abstain from war, whether the desire to abstain at all costs does not fundamentally signify something more deleterious to human development than the contrary attitude, and whether the psychological benefits that regularly recurring warfare brings to a nation are not greater than the total amount of harm done, terrific as this may be.

Some clues were then indicated as to the direction in which psychological research may profitably be further developed with a view to determining the ultimate meaning of war in general. This has to reach beyond the ostensible motives given by the belligerent, and to enquire also into the nature and origin of the various warlike impulses the presence of which is indispensable for a bellicose solution of a problem ever to be regarded as tolerable. It is even possible that the strength of these impulses, for the most part concealed from view, is greater than that of the conscious motives; in any case they are certainly of importance in rendering the latter more acceptable and plausible. Something has been said also about the source of the warlike impulses, and about the possibility of finding other than warlike outlets for their activity.

It is only when we have a fuller understanding of the motives and impulses concerned in war based on a detailed and exact knowledge of Individual Psychology that we can begin to form a

just appreciation of the merits and demerits of war and of its general biological and social significance. War furnishes perhaps the most potent stimulus to human activity in all its aspects, good and bad, that has yet been discovered. It is a miniature of life in general at its sharpest pitch of intensity. It reveals all the latent potentialities of man, and carries humanity to the uttermost confines of the attainable, to the loftiest heights as well as to the lowest depths. It brings man a little closer to the realities of existence, destroying shams and remoulding values. It forces him to discover what are the things that really matter in the end, what are the things for which he is willing to risk life itself. It can make life as a whole greater, richer, fuller, stronger, and sometimes nobler. It braces a nation, as an individual, to put forth its utmost effort, to the strange experience of bringing into action the whole energy of which it is capable.

The results of this tremendous effort are what might have been expected. On the one side are feats of dauntless courage, of fearless heroism, of noble devotion and self-sacrifice, of incredible endurance, of instantaneous and penetrating apprehension, and of astounding intellectual achievement; feats which teach a man that he is greater than he knew. The other side need not be described in these days of horror. To appraise at their just value these two sides of war, to sound the depths as well as explore the heights, what is this other than to know the human mind?

ERNEST JONES.

THE SOLVAY SOCIOLOGICAL INSTITUTE.

I FELT greatly honoured when I received the invitation to write an article about the Solvay Sociological Institute, and yet for a considerable time I was in doubt as to whether I should accept it; for I came over to this country without any books whatsoever, so that I am writing without the aid of documents. But the desire to make British readers more fully acquainted with the institution to which I am personally so much indebted, and at which I received the best part of my scientific training, proved in the end to be stronger than my fear to proceed in an unscientific way. I console myself with the thought that if my description is necessarily incomplete and defective (seeing that I am relying solely upon my memory), I shall be excused on the ground of my good intentions.

The Solvay Sociological Institute is not, as is generally supposed abroad, a kind of sociological faculty; although it is connected with the Brussels University it is essentially a sociological laboratory, devoted to research. The fine building which forms its home stands in one of the public gardens of the capital, the Parc Léopold, on a piece of ground presented by the town council, and quite near to two other annexes of the University, namely, the Institut de Physiologie and the Ecole des Hautes Études Commerciales, both of them founded by the same wealthy philanthropist, M. Ernest Solvay. Its exterior appearance is that of a museum of a graceful architectural form.

I beg the reader to enter in my company. We do not ring the bell, although the entrance door never remains open, for all those who are allowed to frequent the Institute, and who may occasionally introduce a friend, know the secret lock. After having passed through the cloak-room we reach the main hall, which is as high as a church, and is at the same time the library and the main meeting-room. The bookcases are disposed along the walls, and the main space is occupied on the right and on the left by two rows of two-sided mahogany writing desks, on the middle portions of which are placed all the periodical publications which the Institute receives. Each desk has its peculiar kind of reviews: on the first on the left-hand side you find the psychological reviews, while the anthropological magazines are on the desk just opposite to it, and so on. In the middle of the hall are small tables, each one forming the centre of a set of armchairs of the special type which we appropriately call *causeuses*. Your eye is struck by the view of a match-box and an ash-tray? Oh yes, and I point out, as an explanation, that an ash-tray is to be found on every desk, for—suggestive of national customs—smoking is allowed here, except in the basement and the catalogue room, although many women students frequent the Institute.

The man of books, however, soon turns from the sight of the luxurious hall towards the book shelves, and his attention is at once attracted by their curious aspect and arrangement. Each

case bears its number, and each number corresponds to a special subject. There is the case for physiology and psychology, there is the one for archaeology and history; farther on we see the cases for law, for anthropology, for political economy, for agrarian economy, for demography, for sociology, for statistics, etc. The books seem all of the same size, for each of them is put into a cartoon box, open from behind, whilst on the front is printed the title, the name of the author, and the date of publication, the last detail enabling you to infer that the books are stored in chronological order. The cartoon boxes offer another interesting peculiarity, for on the right flank each one bears three columns, thus headed: "Name of the borrower —; Taken away on —; Put back on the —." Each borrower has to put down the required information. That this system allows one to see how often a work has been consulted—the statistical uses of which I need not point out here—is not its only advantage. You appreciate only its practical side if you find the box empty; but you see at once in whose temporary possession it is at the time, and as no books ever leave the Institute you are always able to get it with the assistance of the house-porter. I say the house-porter, for the permanent staff is very small indeed: you are in a library—and how fine a library!—without a librarian. You observe also that the front of the boxes is brown here, green there, blue lower down, etc. Indeed, each language has its own colour and each colour its own shelves.

These few explanations are quite sufficient to prepare you for being your own librarian and to go and fetch for yourself the book you want, provided you keep in mind that you must not look for a psychological book in the statistical section. Still, you may be looking for a book published in 1880, which is already an old book in so new a science. You will not find it here, for through want of space all the books previous to a certain year (I think 1886) are kept in the basement rooms, where you will find also the various collections of the reviews, each one in its own box, to which the principles explained above have been applied. If it is only for a hasty consultation that you want the book which I have helped you to get, then you can sit down in one of the easy-chairs or at one of the desks, where you will find all the materials required for taking notes. But if you are going to undertake research you can be installed more comfortably. The main hall is flanked on either side by an aisle, which is divided into small rooms known in the slang of the initiated as "cells," or "working cells." In each of them there is accommodation for two workers (desk, upright bookcase, etc.), and if you apply to M. Waxweiler, the director, for the temporary use of a cell, stating your purpose, the work you are going to undertake, etc., you will easily get the necessary authorisation, provided that some of these are unoccupied, and you can then make yourself at home. Still better: if you have made an interesting discovery or found a new truth, you will be able to enjoy on the spot the highest pleasure which is kept in store for a worker, for you will be invited to communicate it to fellow-students, who will understand and appreciate you, namely, those in one of the study groups of the Institute corresponding to your own special

subject. These study groups—either the sociological, the historical, the anthropological, the colonial, or the psychological, etc.—meet regularly in the lecture-room, which occupies half of the only floor of the left aisle.

Having now obtained a general and more or less complete view of the building (although I neglected to show you the small anthropological museum, a collection of some costly scientific instruments, etc.), let us now see what was the original aim of its creator, and also what use has been made of his really splendid creation.

The munificent founder and actual supporter, M. Ernest Solvay, is widely known also as a sociologist, and his particular view of sociology was expounded in the first volume published by the Institute, with the title, *Note sur des formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique*.¹ In this note the author wished to formulate the fundamental conclusions to which he has been led and to point out the close bonds which, in his opinion, unite sociological with biological phenomena. Both are manifestations of the universal energy; to build up a positive sociology the study of social groupings ought to be connected with the science of energetics, which dominates nowadays all the natural sciences. This theoretical direction which M. Solvay wished to give to the study of sociological problems was the primary cause of the creation of the Institute, which was to carry his view into practice.

It is interesting to note that Emile Waxweiler, the eminent student whom he happened to meet with in his immediate surroundings, and to whom he fortunately entrusted the leadership and further care of his creation, published in the same year his *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*,² which was nothing else than an actual concretising of the views of the founder. In this work M. Waxweiler aims first at linking the new science of sociology with the *ensemble* of the other fields of knowledge. For him sociology becomes "the science" of the reactional phenomena, due to the mutual excitations of individuals of the same species without any distinction of sex." And keeping in mind that the milieu is inseparable from the individuum, we may speak of a sociological ecology in the same sense as the naturalists of this country employ the word ecology. After having thus defined his standpoint M. Waxweiler examines how the framework of sociological science could be conceived, and then considers the problems which arise at once in his mind as a consequence of the above conception.

The second part of his book consists of a series of suggestions made with the object of provoking researches, almost exclusively in human sociology, wherein mental actions and reactions connect individuals with one another.

1. Cf. E. Solvay. *Note sur des formules d'introduction à l'énergétique physio- et psycho-sociologique*. Notes et Mémoires de l'Institut de Sociologie Solvay, No. 1, 1906. Misch et Thron, Bruxelles.

2. Cf. E. Waxweiler. *Esquisse d'une Sociologie*. No. 2 of the same collection; cf. the former page.

These two treatises are in truth the manifesto, the programme, of the Institute. It is from their standpoint that all the work is carried on, that all the books which have been published in its collections have been written, that all the research work done under its roof is undertaken, that the discussions of the different study groups are conducted, that the review *Archives sociologiques* is written and its book-reviews conceived; it is from this standpoint also that the library is organised and the study groups subdivided. It is perhaps owing to their not having read these leading works that some students have not caught the general idea of the periodical *Archives sociologiques* published under E. Waxweiler's editorship—a fact which they have frankly admitted to me—although they have found the articles themselves interesting and inspired with a thoroughly original spirit.

Let us now consider the beehive in its full activity. Here arises the question: Who frequent the Institute? In the first place there are the students of the University, and not merely those belonging to the faculty of philosophy. One often meets with keen readers among those young men and women, for it is not only owing to the fact that several of their professors belong to the staff of the Institute that they learn the way to it, but perhaps still more as a consequence of the Belgian system of higher education. All our students, or nearly all, are specially trained for research, and they can only get their final diploma by the production of an original work, the conclusions of which they are required to defend in a public discussion. Still, the university youths form perhaps only one-half of the ordinary visitors, for Brussels is an important intellectual centre and the Institute is open, on demand, to all who are interested in any of the special sciences in the sociological field. You will meet there not only with scientists of Brussels but also with men from different Belgian towns who regularly visit Brussels on purpose to take advantage of its treasure of documents, while foreigners, who come and stay there to undertake special researches, are not a rarity. I remind you of the fact that every visitor is allowed to join the special study groups that happen to interest him most.

It may also be worth while to say what becomes of the numerous reviews and new books which are continually entering the Institute. On their reception they are handed to the leaders of the groups, who form in reality the staff, each leader receiving the books and reviews relating to his own subject. Through his care they are distributed among the members of his group for report, and those reports, as well as original contributions, form the programme of the discussions at the group meetings. When a book or an article seems important enough, the reports are developed into a contribution for the *Archives*. Moreover, every book, every article of any importance, is taken note of for the catalogue and for the bibliographical department. The catalogue is as far as possible complete, containing even the titles of works which the library itself does not possess.

In some important cases all the study groups meet together in one big session, on which occasions special invitations are sent to qualified persons who are not ordinary visitors. That was the case

four or five years ago when the rural exodus as a sociological problem was prominent before public opinion in Belgium. On that occasion a deputation of the London Eighty Club, comprising several members of the House of Commons, came to lecture about the measures adopted in England for dealing with the problem. The effect of this session in Belgium was particularly gratifying to all those who took part in it.

Immediately after the death of King Leopold II. public opinion demanded a complete change of the colonial system which had prevailed until then in the Belgian Congo. Some weeks before Parliament was to open the discussion our colonial study group organised a colonial session which was attended by all the Belgian colonial students, some of whom were Deputies and Senators, and the subsequent discussions in Parliament proved abundantly that this initiative had produced a deep impression.

Another characteristic feature of the Institute is the annual function known as "La Semaine Sociale." Every year before the end of the summer term all the students of the University especially, and all interested outsiders, are invited to devote a whole week to the study of one peculiar sociological problem. The programme of the last Semaine Sociale was, if I remember rightly, the study of what corresponds to British trade unionism; the year before it was "The Flemish-Walloon Linguistic Frontier." Such "social weeks" comprise introductory lectures by the best qualified men, besides visits on the spot, after which conclusions are drawn.

The enumeration of the immediate usefulness of the Institute is not yet complete. Forty works have up to the present been published by it, all of them having been written practically under its roof. (I do not mean to say that they are the only works written there, for that would give rise to a misconception.) They are classified under three headings: (1) *Notes et Mémoires*, including only original purely sociological studies; (2) *Etudes sociales*, a series devoted to works belonging to the domain of social sciences in general; (3) *Actualités sociales*, for books which have as their chief aim the popularisation of topical questions, with a view to increasing human productivity. It is through this last series, which comprises already a list of twenty works, that the Institute keeps in constant touch with the ordinary reader, and it is owing to its influence that the name of the Institute is popular throughout Belgium, so that its existence as a scientific creation has a meaning even to the man in the street.

I cannot help thinking that this is a fair balance-sheet after a dozen years of existence; and in the present instance I need not insist upon the scientific value of the work that has been produced. But perhaps I may, in conclusion, be allowed to draw the attention of some of the sociological students in this country to two smaller but very useful services of the Institute, namely, the *Intermédiaire sociologique* and the *Service de documentation*. The former is a kind of association of the sociologists of the whole world, the members engaging themselves to afford one another scientific help, to give mutual information about their special subjects, to communicate bibliographical details, etc. The *Service de documentation* provides the associates free of charge with, as far as possible,

complete bibliographical lists about such subjects as are asked for. The list of requests is published every year in the *Archives*, and it tends to prove that the Institute is gradually increasing the scope of its usefulness in the international progress of the sociological sciences.

All the various departments which have been gradually developed in the Institute are under the constant and active supervision of Professor E. Waxweiler, who is chiefly responsible for their creation, and—*cuique suum*—I shall probably offend greatly his modesty by stating that it is due to him, to his organising talent as well as to his vast knowledge, that the Solvay Sociological Institute has become a scientific establishment of which Belgian students are proud, and which is probably unique in the world.

J. VARENDONCK.

OBITUARY.

EDWARD SPENCER BEESLY.

PROFESSOR BEESLY, who died in his eighty-fifth year on July 7, was one of the original members of the Sociological Society, and although unable by reason of age and absence from London to attend its meetings, he continued to take a keen interest in its work.

Born in the year 1831, he was educated at Wadham College, Oxford, where he had Dr. Richard Congreve as his tutor and Dr. J. H. Bridges and Mr. Frederic Harrison as his fellow-students. Like them, though at a somewhat later date, he became an adherent of the Positive Philosophy and the Religion of Humanity; he translated Comte's *Discourse on the Positive Spirit*; he was responsible for the translation of the third volume of *The Positive Polity*; and he spent a great part of his life in expounding and illustrating Comte's work—especially in its application to history and politics. For thirty-three years he was Professor of History in University College, London, and he gave many courses of historical lectures elsewhere. He was a frequent writer in the *Fortnightly Review*, and was the founder and first editor of the *Positivist Review*. Some of his articles in the former have been republished under the title of *Catiline, Clodius and Tiberius*. He also wrote the volume on Queen Elizabeth in the series of *Twelve English Statesmen*, and the chapter on "England and the Sea" in *International Policy*—a series of essays edited by Dr. Congreve, as well as the biographies of the statesmen of the ancient and modern world in the *New Calendar of Great Men*.

His sociology was essentially based on history, the ordered development of human civilisation. To keen discrimination in judging evidence and a wide knowledge of human nature and the springs of public action, he united a lively and incisive style. He was one of the most accurate and least superficial of historians, and yet no one was more free from a narrow specialism, for to him the history of Western Civilisation was a great whole, interconnected in all its parts, a drama of which each act carried on the central theme, an evolution each stage of which depended on all that had gone before, and led up to all that was to come after. He was fully alive to the human interests of historical narrative, as may be seen for instance in his *Queen Elizabeth*; and to the part played by great men, as shown in his studies of Caesar and Trajan, of William the Silent and Richelieu; but he considered them rather as instruments of great social forces, accelerating the process, than as powers that could turn aside the course of human development. Nor did he believe that history consisted in a minute investigation or accumulation of small facts:—

The thoughts and actions of individuals may baffle our scrutiny. But nations and societies, and even parties, act in obedience to simple motives and broad general principles. The footsteps of the solitary traveller may be easily lost. But he who would follow the track of an army has only to use his eyes.

This is taken from his paper on *Catiline*, and perhaps in no part of his work was he more successful than in bringing light and order to the obscure accounts of the Roman Revolution.

If Professor Beesly based his sociology in the main on the historic evolution, his politics were derived from his sociology. He was profoundly impressed with the relativity of all political forms—their utility depending on their consonance with the general civilisation of the time—a truth more generally recognised now than in his youth. Yet he had a profound distrust of the domination of any class or race. He was the great defender of trade unions when they had few friends. He was the untiring opponent of imperial aggression and domination. In common with the other members of the Positivist school, he was accused of exalting the contributions of France to civilisation at the expense of those made by Germany. In this he was obstinately recalcitrant. In 1870 he urged our Government to step in to prevent the dismemberment of France; he failed then, but he lived to see France and England allied to combat that German aggression which he had so long foreseen and feared.

S. H. SWINNNY.

REVIEWS.

SOCIAL PHENOMENA IN ENGLISH TOWNS.

LIVELIHOOD AND POVERTY. By A. L. Bowley, D.Sc., and A. R. Burnett-Hunt, B.Sc. With an introduction by R. H. Tawney, B.A. G. Bell and Sons, 1915. 3/6 net.

THE MEASUREMENT OF SOCIAL PHENOMENA. By A. L. Bowley, D.Sc. P. S. King, 1915. 3/6 net.

THE publication of *Livelihood and Poverty* marks an important step forward in the evolution of methods of social investigation. To study the economic condition of the working classes on any comprehensive scale has hitherto been supposed to involve, not only the services of a directing brain of a high order and special qualifications, but also the expenditure of a very large amount of time and money. Experience has now pointed the way to a certain simplification of method. The co-ordinating brain, it hardly needs saying, is as necessary as ever for work of this kind, but a method of study has been developed by the authors of the present work which very considerably economises the time and money necessary for investigation. This is achieved by taking random samples in a town or district as subjects of observation instead of visiting every house in a street or every street in a district. The method has been subjected to mathematical tests and found satisfactory; its results also, when comparable with official statistics, such as the Census, are quite sufficiently in harmony therewith to inspire confidence. In this way the material necessary for economic analysis can be collected under skilled direction by a small body of social workers of average intelligence and training, working only for a comparatively short time. The present work therefore, for all its small size and unpretending exterior, is a brilliant example of selection; what was superfluous and over-laborious in these classical models has been dropped, what was valuable has been utilized in new ways, and for the discovery of new knowledge of an important kind.

A special feature of interest is that four towns have been taken for comparison, and we thus get a combined view of poverty under varying industrial conditions. Northampton is a boot and shoe manufacturing centre; Stanley is a district almost entirely dependent on coal mining. Warrington and Reading, on the other hand, are similar in possessing a larger number and variety of industries than the other two towns; they differ in that the one shows large groups respectively of well and ill paid workers, while the other has no considerable group of highly paid workers.

Tables analyzing the composition of the family into earners and non-earners, and also according to age and sex, are given on pp. 29 and 30. It has been sometimes alleged that the employment of women in manufactures tends to drag down the average wage, and that family incomes where women work tend to approximate to the wages of the male head of the family where women do not work. This is hardly borne out by the tables before us. Northampton has the largest percentage of women and girls earning (13.5), and the lowest percentage of poverty (9). On the other hand, Warrington and Reading show but little difference in the percentage

of women and girls earning (8.5 and 9.7), and a considerable difference in the percentage of poverty (15 and 29).

To measure the proportion of poverty in a given district or its relation in several districts some standard must be adopted for purposes of comparison, and the standard here favoured follows Mr. Rowntree's with some slight modification. The "new standard," as it is called in this volume, means a regular income capable of purchasing a bare sufficiency of food and clothing for the members of the family, after paying for rent, fuel, and household sundries. The percentage of families falling below this line is found, as we have seen, to be 9 in Northampton, 15 in Warrington, and 29 in Reading (p. 43). In the case of dependents (young children, invalids, aged, etc.), however, the proportion living in poverty is much higher, *viz.*, 13, 19, and 37 per cent. respectively. (The figures for Stanley are considered too few to be reduced to percentages, so we need not reproduce them.)

The figures in regard to young children and infants are worse still. Of infants under 5, 17 per cent. in Northampton, 22.5 per cent. in Warrington, and 45 per cent. in Reading are living below the poverty line; and of school children who are not earning, 16 per cent. in Northampton, 25 per cent. in Warrington, and 47 per cent. in Reading are so placed (p. 44).

An analysis of the principal immediate causes of poverty (p. 40) shows that in a large majority of cases poverty is due to insufficiency of earnings on a basis of regular employment, and only in a minority to irregular earnings or to the death, incapacity or unemployment of the chief wage-earner. We reproduce these figures in an abridged form. The Rowntree standard is the one used in this case, and Mr. Rowntree's results at York, 1899, are added for comparison:—

Immediate Cause of Poverty.	Percentage of Households below Rowntree Standard.			
	N.	W.	R.	York.
Chief wage earner dead, ill or old	35	7	25	37
out of work or irregularly employed ...	—	6	6	6
Chief wage earner regularly employed :				
at earnings insufficient for 3 children :				
3 children or less	21	22	33	57
4 children or more	9	38	15	
Wage sufficient for 3, but family more than 3	35	27	21	
	100	100	100	100

"It can hardly be too emphatically stated," the authors write, "that of all the causes of primary poverty which have been brought to our notice low wages are by far the most important. We would go further and say that to raise the wages of the worst-paid workers is the most pressing social task with which the country is confronted to-day."

In view of the tremendous ordeal through which the nation is now passing, the problem of poverty and inefficiency is likely to receive little immediate attention, yet perhaps its urgency has never been greater. We all depend now on the nerve, health, and energy, the self-control, vigour, and good habits of the whole people; that is, of all of us. Poverty, sordid, mean and unhealthful poverty such as is here shown to be the lot of so many, is not exactly a school of patriotic virtues. And poverty here appears not as the just reward of laziness or misconduct, or even as a result of accident or unforeseen misfortune which can be remedied or consoled by

personal help and charity. It appears as the inevitable result of defects in our industrial system, not to be avoided by the most regular, plodding, uncomplaining persistence in work. The facts here collected and studied with complete scientific impartiality are likely to induce reflection in the minds of many social workers, and may probably effect some shifting of values in the ethics hitherto largely accepted by the middle and upper classes.

The Measurement of Social Phenomena contains the substance of some public lectures delivered in the spring of 1914, and is mostly taken up with the criticism and appraisal of the statistical material issued by and for government departments, much of which is "merely a by-product of administrative needs," not related to any orderly scientific connected view of the nation's life and activity. The "scepticism of the instrument" is a phrase that will recur involuntarily to most readers on their way through the book; but Dr. Bowley is not altogether a sceptic. "If we can define the task of sociological measurement, determine what are the facts which it is essential to know, and devise a means of ascertaining them, half the task is accomplished. . . . Official information, imperfectly and badly adapted for sociological purposes as it often is, generally suffices to show the magnitude, nature and locality of a problem; common knowledge, obtainable by conversation with those who have lived in close contact with its circumstances, will place it in fair perspective; while a rapid investigation by sample will give an approximation to detailed measurements." To obtain a clear view of a given society, judgment and criticism are of more value in the use of statistics than the laborious accumulation of figures for its own sake; indeed, a hint is given that the latter process has had in recent years an "over-luxuriant growth." Exact measurements are often not possible, but we can arrive at a relative exactitude by the use of a margin of uncertainty.

While less important, or at all events less arresting, than the original work contained in *Livelihood and Poverty*, the companion volume affords a valuable brief survey of statistical material up to date, and its suggestions should be a powerful aid to sanity in the mind of the student. Neither volume, unfortunately, is provided with an index. B. L. HUTCHINS.

RECONSTRUCTION AFTER THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR.

THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39TH CONGRESS, 1865—1867. By Benj. B. KENDRICK, Ph.D. New York: Columbia University. London: P. S. King and Son.

DURING the eighty years that followed the Declaration of Independence, the Union of the States constituting the great republic seemed to be more and more firmly established. Certainly there was an immense veneration for the Constitution and its founders, a pride in the greatness of the country, an unchallenged belief in its glorious future. But if these were tendencies making for union, on the other hand, the institution of slavery and the economic interests bound up with it were a growing source of disunion. The founders of the Republic who boldly faced so many difficulties, rejecting the drastic medicine of abolition proposed by one of the greatest among them, the Virginian slave-owner Jefferson, left to their posterity the solution of a problem which became more difficult with every generation.

The nice balance by which a slave state and a free state were admitted alternately, as the new territories filled up, was threatened by the geographical formation of the continent which, widening to the North, gave promise that the free states must sooner or later outnumber the slave, at the very moment when throughout these free states the tide of indignation against slavery was beginning to rise. It is not possible here to enter into the attempts to introduce slavery into Missouri and Kansas, to recount the foundation of the Republican Party, or to discuss whether a Sovereign State that had entered into the Union could leave it at its pleasure. It is sufficient to note that the South, after having had at least its full share of power during the nation's history, plunged into secession, as soon as Lincoln was elected President and before any hostile action had been taken against it. Nor is it necessary to enquire whether the existence of slavery was the cause of the conflict. Without slavery there would have been no civil war; and with the victory of the North, whatever may have been the professions made at the beginning of the conflict, slavery was bound to pass away.

But that victory placed a new problem before the victors—the treatment of the seceding states. Were they to be still considered as States in the Union or had they by their rebellion lost that position? Were they to be administered as Territories or as conquered provinces? On what terms were they to be re-admitted to full rights? Under the old arrangement, in calculating the number of representatives to which a State was entitled, five slaves counted as three free persons. Were negroes, now free but not entitled to vote, to be counted on this or on some other basis? Were States which kept large numbers of adult men disfranchised, nevertheless to be allowed to count them, in order to obtain a number of representatives in Congress out of all proportion to the number of their voters? Was the vote of a rebel in the South thus to outweigh the vote of a loyalist in the North? Again, were the few Whites and the many Negroes in the South who had supported the Union to be left at the mercy of the majority of Whites who had inflicted on their country all the horrors of civil war? Were the civil rights, the property, even in extreme cases, the life and liberty of the loyal to be within the power of the disloyal and the defeated? Were the Southern States to be at liberty to repudiate the Union debt and recognise that of the rebels? All these were questions that on the assembling of the thirty-ninth Congress in the year 1865 required a speedy and definite answer.

There were also some minor complications. Andrew Johnson, who had been elected as Vice-President, and had become President on the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, never secured the confidence of Congress or the country. His attempt to set up governments in the secessionist States, without securities for future good behaviour, and his use of the veto, angered the great majority of his own party. The Republicans in the Senate were, however, more moderate than those in the House; and Johnson might have come to terms with the former. To obviate any differences between the party in the two branches of the Legislature, the expedient of a joint Committee of Fifteen was resorted to. The volume under our consideration deals with the constitution and work of this Committee, to which for the time all questions of Reconstruction were referred. The book contains an Introduction, the Minute Book of the Committee, an account of its personnel, and a series of luminous essays on the questions at issue.

The Joint Committee consisted of six members of the Senate and nine of the House. Of these fifteen, three were Democrats, five conservative Republicans, and seven more or less radical Republicans. The radical Republicans, who eventually controlled reconstruction, could therefore have been outvoted, had the Democrats supported the conservative Republicans; but on the Committee and still more in the House, the Democrats adopted the desperate policy of trying to ruin Republican schemes of reconstruction by supporting the extremists, and so gave the latter the victory. If the South had to suffer from governments run by corrupt adventurers supported by an ignorant negro vote, the fault was largely due to the action of their own especial friends and defenders. The chairman of the Committee, Senator Fessenden of Maine, was a statesman of considerable ability and unblemished character. Though conservative in his views on reconstruction, he kept an open mind and on one or two critical occasions voted with the extremists. Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the extremists in the House and on the Committee, is a more interesting and more hated personality. His ability as a speaker and still more as a parliamentary tactician, has been acknowledged or rather proclaimed by his foes. As the chief author of the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing, among other things, the civil rights of men of every race, and as the promoter of the measures of reconstruction ultimately adopted, his memory has been vindictively pursued by the friends of the South. Much of this abuse he certainly does not deserve. He was the reverse of a professional politician. He only cared for politics when associated to some cause on which he felt deeply. He twice retired into private life—the second time when sixty-one years old. He was no doubt a negrophile, but if an exaggerated belief in the capacity of the people of colour detracts from our estimate of his intellectual power—which has never been questioned—his steady championship of the oppressed, who could make him no direct return, is a testimony to his moral worth. He was that dangerous creature, a clever and unselfish fanatic, a class rich in heroic deeds and always the especial objects of hatred to their victims. But the fanaticism of Stevens was combined not only with intellectual dexterity, but with more common sense than his tribe usually possess. Later writers have ridiculed the gift of a vote to the ignorant negro on the verge of economic ruin. Stevens, however, proposed a great confiscation of rebel lands, whereby the cost of the civil war could be defrayed and the emancipated slaves—each on his own holding—might obtain a secure position. The clemency of the North prevented this; and there is no doubt that that clemency, acting on a people completely defeated, did much to unite in friendship those who were so recently opponents in battle.

But was it necessarily wrong to give the Negro a vote, even if he had no share in the land? With those, if such there be at the present time, who consider the vote a "natural right," the claims of the Negro need not be argued: it follows from the fantastic premises. But those who look upon the vote as either an instrument of government or a means of protection, will have more difficulty in answering the question; for the two considerations are sometimes in opposition. Let us first, to clear up this point, take a case of a claim to vote when the verdict will generally be in the negative. Lads under twenty-one would not on the whole be likely to make as good voters as men—they are not "political animals" even to the same small extent as the latter. But as their economic interests are to some extent antagonistic to those of men, is not the vote necessary for their

protection? In this case certain circumstances mitigate the antagonism. The majority of youths live with their families. It is the interest of their fathers that their sons should not be underpaid; it is the interest of the sons that their fathers' economic position should not be undermined by the competition of boy labour; and both sides are united by the ties of family affection and daily intercourse. Hence it is recognised that there is no such disparity of interests as would justify the introduction of a great body of immature voters. In the case of the Negroes, on the other hand, there are no bonds of interest or affection which would make the white voters safe guardians. Even if it be admitted that negro voters just emancipated would not be likely to aid good government, might not the vote be necessary for their protection? Are Stevens and his friends to be blamed because they allowed the second object to outweigh the first—because, at the risk of enfranchising immature unfit voters, they gave the coloured people a weapon of defence?

S. H. SWINNY.

SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS A SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY.

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM. By Charles A. Ellwood, Professor of Sociology in the University of Missouri. Macmillan. 5/6.

THIS book has considerable value, as a symptom and a stimulus, though we cannot subscribe to the special terms of praise, quoted from another American professor, on the cover. It summarises a good deal of wisdom on various social problems of the day and shows what is the general social philosophy needed to inspire and hold it all together. But it contains no new or very penetrating analysis of any one topic and is disfigured by a large amount of unnecessary commonplace and of balanced statements which leave no definite impression behind. Sociology must necessarily deal with generalisations which have passed current through many minds before they are put in their scientific setting, and this fact often causes a revolt in critical minds which have discussed these questions abundantly before they are presented to them in the guise of a new thought. The disappointment and the revolt are in such cases natural, but in the opinion of this reviewer, do not deprive the restated commonplace of its value. It is to be hoped indeed that the greatest truths will become more and more the greatest commonplaces, but they will need fresh point and new setting to justify their repetition. This maxim of prudence and of art one cannot feel that Professor Ellwood has sufficiently observed, and when he tells us that it "may take the labour and wisdom of many generations to build the ideal society of humanity," or "humanity must, of course, become debarbarised before it becomes truly civilised" or "religion especially stands for the spiritual life of man," we are apt to hurry over the really important truths which give significance to his work.

The gist of the book is that western society needs a new spiritual awakening in order to solve the many dangerous social problems which confront it, and Professor Ellwood, who is generous and candid in admitting his obligations, would probably not demur to our describing this spiritual awakening, as he envisages it, as the infusion of Comte's Positivism into an undogmatic Christianity. It is an interesting and possibly a tenable anticipation of the religious future, but like so many other points on which the book touches, it makes one wish for a more searching discussion of the question. However, the standpoint thus given is unmistakeable and on the whole sound. If we put a spiritual solution in the forefront, economic, material and political factors take a subordinate though important place.

"Intellect has been the certain factor in human progress in the past," and "intelligence and altruism must work together to produce the fully socialised character" in the future.

It is thus a higher social intelligence which is to inform and direct the ideals of western peoples in the future, and Professor Ellwood discusses briefly how this will affect "four lines of spiritual possession" which have been allowed to fall into decay, *viz.* the family, government, religion, and morality. This part of the book, to which we turn with most hope of guidance, is, however, confined to thirty pages, and it must be confessed that the conclusion does not amount to much more than telling us that in each case the service of humanity must dominate sectional and selfish interests. It is profoundly true and supremely important, and we are glad to hear the ring of so honest a voice from the other side of the Atlantic in accord with our own, and speaking evidently for many more in America than would avow themselves Christian Positivists in England. Yet the inquirer who turns to the volume 'as the best existing application of sociological thinking to practical problems' will be inevitably disappointed in not finding any definite guidance in the vexed problems that arise when we begin to apply the new and wider notices of science and humanity to the old 'spiritual possessions' of the family and religion, the state and morality. To name only one great topic under each heading—divorce, church membership, international sanction for international law, the religious and moral education of the young—these are the matters on which the far-thinking men and women of the twentieth century will have to learn how to apply their principles. I do not complain that Professor Ellwood does not enter into these and similar questions in detail, but I do assert, without fear of contradiction, that anyone who does so will pursue his path without any inkling of the direction in which the Professor, or his principles, as here expounded, will lead him. It may be permitted to one who, heartily sympathising with Professor Ellwood's general attitude, leans rather to the Positive than the Christian side of his combination, to suggest that what is needed is more stress on the actual achievement of man's intellect in the past, more confidence in what it may do in the future by boldly facing the difficulties which confront us. Civilisation is not really, as Professor Ellwood asserts, "from its very nature a fragile affair." On the contrary, it is a very solid and deep-rooted thing, the result of a slow and steady, though sometimes interrupted growth. Nor ought we to regard ourselves as 'transmitting unimpaired to the future our spiritual possessions' now threatened with decay, but rather as transmuting and strengthening them by the far greater power of a deeper intelligence more widely diffused. Even the Labour troubles of the recent past and the greatest war of the present need not make us despair or doubtful of the future. But we need to think steadily and clearly and to believe in thinking.

F. S. MARVIN.

MODERN MOVEMENTS IN INDIA.

MODERN RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS IN INDIA. By J. N. Farquhar. Macmillan. 8/6 net.

THE ARYA SAMAJ. By Lajpat Rai. With an introduction by Sidney Webb. Longmans. 5/- net.

MR. FARQUHAR has undertaken a task that has long been awaiting a competent hand. The many social, religious, and educational movements provoked or stimulated by Western influences in India have not hitherto

been surveyed as a whole, and there are very few scholars, either English or Indian, who have the necessary qualifications for the work. Mr. Farquhar, although he starts with a marked missionary bias, may be regarded as one of the few, since he has spent many years in the country, as student and teacher, working under conditions which brought him into direct contact with several of the larger movements and less directly into relations with some others less known. His book furnishes evidence of the number and variety of Indian socio-religious activities, and in this respect it will enlighten many readers who may have considered themselves fairly well acquainted with the main currents of contemporary India.

The basis of the volume is a series of lectures delivered in 1913 at the Hartford Theological Seminary under the Hartford-Lamson foundation. The lectures have been worked over and largely augmented, but they reveal here and there, in numerous repetitions, the conditions of the original preparation. The plan of the survey is clear and good. After a very brief historical sketch of India since 1800, Mr. Farquhar examines the movements "favouring vigorous reform"—that is, the Brahma Samaj, founded in 1828, and its derivatives; then those, of which the Arya Samaj is the most important, which he describes as "reform checked by defence of the old faiths"; next the various forces of the Hindu Revival, which he dates from 1870, the religious nationalism of the past twenty years, and finally the growth of bodies devoted to social reform and social service.

The first section deals with a movement which is, with one possible exception referred to below, the most familiar to European readers. The story of the Brahma Samaj has frequently been told. Mr. Farquhar rightly takes the ideas and aims of its founder, Ram Mohun Roy, as the starting-point of modern influences in India, and he shows how closely they were allied with the policy of the Enlightenment period represented by the governor-generalship of Lord William Bentinck. Mr. Farquhar, perhaps, does not sufficiently emphasize the striking personal qualities either of Ram Mohun Roy or of Keshub Chunder Sen, nor does he endeavour to depict the extraordinary social upheaval which occurred in Bengal during the middle of the nineteenth century, when the new theistic church, with its startling programme of social advance, came into collision with both orthodox Hinduism and Christian missions. Half a century ago the Brahma Samaj was a community of very great promise; and there are few more distressing chapters in the annals of reform than the story of its collapse. For a generation, says Mr. Farquhar, "the Samaj has been dismembered and rendered impotent by divisions and brawls; and there is no sign of betterment"—a conclusion which it would be difficult to contest.

With the exception of the Arya Samaj (with which we will deal later) there appears to be little of serious import to be discovered in the interesting organisations which Mr. Farquhar classifies as reform combined with a retention of specifically Indian ideas. This is a region almost unexplored by European students, who should be grateful for Mr. Farquhar's summary of the history and tenets of the Radha Soami Satsang, the Deva Samaj, and other attempts to adapt the old bottles to the new wine.

It is, however, in the section dealing with the Hindu Revival that the most interesting, and most controversial, part of Mr. Farquhar's material is found. He complains of being hampered by the lack of space. That being so, why devote a hundred pages to the story of Theosophy in India? The temptation, to be sure, is severe. Most critics who set out to follow the stages of the Theosophical Society, and especially the adventures of Madame

Blavatsky and Colonel Olcott, become fascinated by the Madras phenomena and Dr. Hodgson's inquiry and its results: perhaps the most curious chapter in the history of the modern mind in relation to facts and evidence. But after all it has comparatively little to do with Indian religious movements, and since it is widely known through the endless controversies of thirty years, Mr. Farquhar might have cut this chapter very short; but had he done so, he would have made his book considerably less entertaining.

Mr. Farquhar's review of the Ramakrishna-Vivekananda movement is singularly incomplete. He gives a sympathetic account of the life and influence of Ramakrishna, but of the disciple who carried his message to England and America he has little good to say. He is offended by what he calls his "swagger" and by his glorification of everything Indian, and he implies that Vivekananda's influence is actually greater in America than in India. This is a reading of a remarkable movement which Mr. Farquhar's wide knowledge of the student community in Bengal should have availed to correct. Nor is he, we think, quite satisfactory in his analysis of what he calls religious nationalism. A few accurate and searching sentences suggest the importance of Lord Curzon's viceroyalty in relation to the movement, and Mr. Farquhar expresses scepticism in regard to some of Sir Valentine Chirol's conclusions. He seems, however, to give too much weight to the Chirol view in general, and makes no reference to Mr. Edwyn Bevan's fine and understanding monograph on the subject. Also he adopts the word "anarchism" in the loose sense made current by the Indian Press. Mr. Farquhar's concluding chapter, on the significance of the movements reviewed, is in some ways the most important in the book. They represent, he points out, "the steady advance of the ancient faiths," and yet he contends that the advance is altogether illusory. In every one of the influences, in every programme, he sees the working not merely of Western but of Christian leaven, and he is convinced that all the Asiatic systems are in full decay. This, obviously, is a prophecy which the future alone can confirm or discredit.

Mr. Farquhar is a careful student and a practised writer, but there are chapters here that are not up to his level. He is careless about names. "Lord Bentinck" appears throughout for Lord William Bentinck, and one notes the too common carelessness and variation in the spelling of Indian names—*e.g.*, Dutt in one place is Datta a few pages off. "Sastri" is a very unscholarlike way of referring to Pundit Siva Nath Sastri even in abbreviation. The lists of authorities are both incomplete and indiscriminating. Nevertheless the book is eminently useful, and it has the advantage of being the only one in English on its very interesting theme.

Mr. Lajpat Rai is clearly the man above all others fitted to tell the story of the Arya Samaj and to expound its tenets and aims for Western readers. He has been a leader in the movement for many years, prominent in the manifold social activities of the Samaj, and he was among the creators of the important Anglo-Vedic college at Lahore. He gives an excellent biographical sketch of the founder, Swami Dayanand, and a full account of the remarkable work in education and social service that has been and is carried on by the Samaj. Not the least interesting part of the volume is the chapter devoted to the Gurukula at Hardwar, the great pilgrim centre on the Upper Ganges—the characteristic Arya School which Mr. Sidney Webb in his introduction refers to as "perhaps the most fascinating educational experiment in the whole world." It is, among other things,

an example of the new Indian monasticism. The chapter on the Arya Samaj in Mr. Farquhar's book, written before Mr. Lajpat Rai had entered upon his task, contains the prediction that the Samaj cannot grow because its tenet regarding the infallibility of the Vedas is entirely out of accord with the modern mind. The fact of course is so : but churches no less than other societies have an astonishing power of modifying or transforming the formularies of belief ; and neither the census figures nor the facts as to the Samaj's varied activities go any distance towards supporting Mr. Farquhar's prediction of failure. Certainly it would be hard to think of any Indian movement in the social and religious sphere which displays at present so many evidences of vigour.

S. K. RATCLIFFE.

A NIGERIAN PEOPLE.

WOMAN'S MYSTERIES OF A PRIMITIVE PEOPLE. By D. Amaury Talbot. Cassell and Co. 10/6 net.

Mrs. AMAURY TALBOT describes in this book the life-history, customs, and beliefs of the Ibibio women of Southern Nigeria. For nearly six years she accompanied her husband, the commissioner of the district, on his journeyings and so had a unique opportunity of studying at first hand the women of a hitherto little known race. The result is the revelation of a wealth of folk-lore, legend, customs, fetish rites and ceremonies which could only have been discovered by a woman "without some man intervening either as inquirer or interpreter," since they are by their nature absolutely closed to men. The legends are often beautiful and are told with great charm ; the customs are ethnologically interesting, whilst the fetish rites and ceremonies are barbarous and cruel. The combination of the poetical sense, natural affection, and barbaric customs indicates, as Mrs. Talbot points out, that this people did not always occupy their present low rung on the ladder of culture. The wide variety in the types illustrated in the book supports her theory, for whilst some look like "mere mud-fish" (the description of one traveller), others appear of a distinctly intelligent type and capable of high culture.

The belief that twin children have a demoniacal origin and its cruel consequences, the destruction of the children and the outcasting of the mother, have far-reaching effects, one interesting development being the "twin town" of the outcasts which has produced a community of women who, having turned their disgrace into honour, dwell together in Obio Ibau-Ibau, *i.e.*, the Town of Women, where strangers seek them to learn magic and healing. The Ibibio women appear to be of a higher intellectual type than the men, and at one stage they rose to dominion over the men. The "Egbo," the most powerful secret society, we are told, was formed originally by the women, but the men wrested from them its secrets and drove out the women from participation therein. Of special interest is the chapter on "Woman in War Time," which brings home the close bond binding all women, the most highly civilized and deeply barbaric.

"When the Efik warriors left the town, the wives who remained behind used to go to their sleeping rooms and there don the garments of their absent lords. . . . Once clad in this strange attire, the women sallied forth to visit the chief compounds of the town, drinking palm wine, laughing and jesting at each. No matter how heavy and anxious might be the hearts beneath this manly guise, they dared not show the least sign of sadness or anxiety, but must appear happy and brave, that by

sympathetic magic the courage of their absent husbands should be upheld." (p. 191.)

To women belong also the secret rites decreed by ancient law for the burial of a warrior.

"When a man in the prime of life is cut off in battle, the body is carried home to the dead man's town by wedded women who are his next of kin. No man may touch the corpse. Weeping and singing sad songs, it is borne by their gentle hands to a place of thick bush called 'owok afai'—the forest of those slain by sudden death. . . . No maiden may be present at these rites; only to wives may such sad mysteries be revealed." (p. 205.)

The book contains many descriptions of these interesting ceremonies which could only be revealed to women, and the reading of it suggests the great possibilities for women who can bring to their task the same sympathy and care as Mrs. Talbot, to reveal the inner mysteries of women of other barbaric and semi-barbaric races. The illustrations are from photographs by Mr. Talbot; they give some idea of the luxuriant vegetation and general beauty of Nigeria—a beauty which explains the poetic feeling of its inhabitants. A map of Nigeria would be a useful addition.

M. ASHWORTH.

SOME BOOKS ON THE WAR.

LA BELGIQUE NEUTRE ET LOYALE. Par Emile Waxweiler. Librairie Payot et Cie, 1915. 2 fr. 50.

THIS volume consists of a lucid explanation of the nature of neutrality, to justify his definition of which M. Waxweiler adduces very numerous facts. He writes with passionate conviction, but this does not at all warp his judgment or detract from the judicial value of the book, which furnishes irrefutable evidence of Germany's guilt and Belgium's innocence. But as the reader is conducted from point to point of the indictment he cannot help accusing the Belgians, and still more the English, of some unintelligence in their dealings with the Germans, and wondering whether failure to understand other people's crimes and evil dispositions is not almost as reprehensible as illiberality and aggression. Belgium, he will remember, paid for more than half of the railway without which the invasion would have been impossible; and not very long ago she allowed the Germans to show a map, at a Brussels exhibition, on which Holland, Belgium and portions of Hungary, France, Italy and Russia were assigned to the Kaiser's empire. But the generosity of her policy and the desolation which it has brought upon her dwarf these mistakes into insignificance; and anyone who reads this book, unless his mind has been poisoned, will more than ever admire and sympathize with the small nation which has suffered the bitterest sorrow endured by any people of the modern world.

The matter is admirably arranged and indexed, and is set forth on broad-margined pages, at any one of which the book will lie open, although it has only a flexible binding of paper. Both the form and the contents recall the scientific and artistic excellence for which the publications issued by M. Waxweiler and his colleagues have become famous; and they suggest that if the transgression of the Germans had consisted only in stopping the work of the Solvay Institute, for a time, it would have been a serious offence against civilization.

REFLECTIONS OF A NON-COMBATANT. By M. D. Petre. Longmans, 2/6 net.

"In this little work," says Miss Petre, "an attempt has been made to show that mankind is working simultaneously on two planes: the plane of national and international politics, and the plain of human aspiration and endeavour, and that the laws of the one are not the laws of the other." In other words, that war is and must be ruthless destruction: it is not sport, and can never be humanized. "Civilized warfare is, properly and strictly, not warfare at all." Similarly, diplomacy is and must be Machiavellism, and the only successful diplomatist is the man whose aim is that of Bismarck: "My ideal for foreign ministers is that their decisions should be unprejudiced and free from all impressions of aversion or preference for foreign lands or their rulers." The facts of war and diplomacy being so, Miss Petre urges that mankind must decide whether they are to be a lasting factor of international life; and her conclusion may be almost as unwelcome to the orthodox pacifist as to the militarist. "One thing this war should have taught those who were in too great a hurry for the accomplishment of their ideals—and that is a fuller respect for the irresistible forces of life." Miss Petre's reflections are meant to stimulate thinking, and in that they are undoubtedly successful. They are full of vision and fine feeling, expressed with force and beauty.

WHY EUROPE IS AT WAR: the Question Considered from the Points of View of Several Nations. Edited by General F. V. Greene. Putnam. 3/6 net.

IN February last a meeting was held at Buffalo to hear addresses on the issues of the war from speakers representing four of the belligerent nations. These addresses have been revised and enlarged, and edited by General Greene, who contributes a somewhat sentimental introduction and a concluding chapter which is a fair statement of the position of the United States. Mr. F. R. Coudert, who presents the French case, deals at length, as we should expect, with the question of Alsace-Lorraine and with the Triple Entente. Mr. F. W. Whitridge, who published some months ago a book on the side of the Allies, speaks for England, but deals more with German ambitions and methods than with British policy. Dr. T. Iyenaga, in explaining the place of Japan in the war, supplies a useful summary of the relations between the European Powers and the Far East since the Japan-China war. This chapter and the one by Dr. Edmund von Mach on the German case will be, for readers on this side, the freshest in the volume. Dr. von Mach furnishes an instructive example of the German temper and controversial method. Revising his Buffalo speech, apparently at the end of March, he finds it possible to make the assertion that the Commission appointed by the British Government (presumably the Bryce Commission) had "found it impossible to substantiate one single charge of atrocity against the Germans"! Dr. von Mach's contribution to the discussion will help to make the English reader understand the fate of the German propaganda in the United States.

THE UNMAKING OF EUROPE. By Philip W. Wilson. Nisbet and Co. 3/6 net.

It is not quite clear why Mr. Wilson should say that he approaches the events of the war "from what is, perhaps, an unusual angle": for, in point of fact, his book is a rapid journalistic review, which makes no claim to be critical, of the more conspicuous aspects of the moving scene down to

the end of 1914. It is effectively written, and the facts have been selected and grouped with more care than is displayed in many books on the war. We notice, however, here and there statements which went round the world last autumn but have since been corrected. It is an instructive exercise to compare point by point Mr. Wilson's summary of the diplomatic correspondence with that given from the opposite standpoint by Dr. von Mach in the volume dealt with above.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1914 IN FRANCE AND BELGIUM. By G. H. Perris. Hodder and Stoughton, 10/6 net.

MR. PERRIS was in France as special correspondent during the opening months of the war. From Paris in August and September he supplied to a London newspaper some of the most vivid and accurate accounts of the invasion and its reaction upon Paris, and he was exceptionally well placed for recording the events of the battle of the Marne and the retreat of the German armies. His book is a careful and lucid summary of the campaign to the end of the year. As an exposition of the strategy and movements it is, necessarily, tentative, as all histories of the war written at this stage must be; but it has permanent value as the record of a conscientious observer and a painstaking student of war. The introduction, resuming the diplomatic relations, might have been omitted, since it has been done elsewhere by hundreds of pens. In the concluding chapter, dealing with war as it is, Mr. Perris shows in how striking a fashion the late M. de Bloch anticipated some of the most important experiences and results of the European War.

EVOLUTION AND THE WAR. By P. Chalmers Mitchell. John Murray, 2/6 net.

THE thesis of war as a biological necessity, combined with the conception of the chosen race as expounded by the exponents of Teutonism, is examined by Dr. Chalmers Mitchell in one of the most suggestive little books provoked by the war. The reader who wishes to know how the philosophic biologist meets the militarist perversion of the Darwinian hypothesis will find here exactly the thing of which he is in search, together with a telling collection of scientific illustrations. The introductory chapter is an interesting piece of autobiography. It reveals the fact that Dr. Chalmers Mitchell was the author of a *Saturday Review* article (1896) on a biological view of foreign policy which has acquired some importance from the use made of it in recent Anglo-German controversy. It is a very emphatic statement of the argument which the book itself is written to demolish.

THE HEALING OF NATIONS. By Edward Carpenter. Allen and Unwin, 2/- net.

MR. CARPENTER'S aim is to discover the hidden sources of the strife of nations. His book is made up of reprinted articles and reflections jotted down at intervals since the outbreak of war. There is, as his readers know, a complete consistency in Mr. Carpenter's criticism of modern industrial society, and he does not find anything in the present conflict to drive him from his central position—the conviction that peace and stability are incompatible with what he regards as the profound disorder of the existing social system. "To live straightforwardly by your own labour is to be at peace with the world. To live on the labour of others is not only to render your life false at home, but it is to encroach on those around you, to invite resistance and hostility." In a short appendix Mr. Carpenter has brought together a number of extracts from manifestoes, speeches, and the letters of public men which illustrate current views of the struggle.

NATIONALITY AND THE WAR. By Arnold J. Toynbee. J. M. Dent and Sons. 7/6 net.

WHILE innumerable writers on the side of the Allies are content to talk vaguely about the necessity of a resettlement of Europe upon the lines of national tradition and consciousness, Mr. Arnold Toynbee has grappled with the problem in the mass and in detail. His book, one of the most valuable contributions to the study of international relations published during recent years, deserves a full review instead of the meagre notice which we are obliged to give it here. It has already, however, been welcomed in every part of the world, and serious students do not need to have their attention drawn to it.

GERMAN CULTURE: PAST AND PRESENT. By E. Belfort Bax. Allen and Unwin. 4/6 net.

It is not often that we have to notice a book with a title so curiously and needlessly misleading as the one Mr. Bax (or his publisher) has chosen in this instance. A few pages only, at the end, are devoted to contemporary Germany, and the last chapter, headed "Modern German Culture," is prefaced by a repetition of the now familiar warning that "culture" in English means intellectual attainments while *kultur* is simply equivalent to our word "civilisation." As, therefore, the book is professedly concerned with German culture, the reader may have a sense of grievance when he finds that he has got hold of a short account of the social evolution of Germany since the fifteenth century. But he will acknowledge, none the less, that here is an admirable theme for a popular monograph. Mr. Bax has a wide knowledge of Germany during the mediæval and Reformation periods, and he had already dealt with several aspects of German social history in his books on *German Society at the Close of the Middle Ages*, *The Peasants' War*, and *The Anabaptists*, all of which are serious studies and have furnished part of the material for the volume now before us. Mr. Bax, seizing the present opportunity, passes in swift review the social aspects of the Reformation, German town and country life during the great transition, the religious wars and their results. Having done this he has only the scantiest space for the modern age, and what he has to say of the present is certainly not good enough for a man of the author's standing. Notwithstanding the failure of the Social Democratic Party "to stem the rising tide of militarism and jingoism in the German people," Mr. Bax holds to the belief that before many months are over the scales will fall from the eyes of the masses and "a revolutionary movement in Germany will be one of the signs that will herald the dawn of a better day for Germany and for Europe."

TOWARDS RACIAL HEALTH. By Norah H. March, B.Sc. Routledge and Co. 3/6 net.

WE do not hesitate to say that Miss March's book, which is commended by Professor J. Arthur Thomson as a wise and sympathetic study, is the best manual of sex hygiene for parents, teachers and social workers that has so far come into our hands. Miss March writes from practical experience of teaching, and in working out her scheme she considers the sex impulse in relation to the life history of individual animals and to the kingdom of sentient beings, giving the theme an admirable largeness and sanity of view. The care of the child, the mental development of the adolescent, the question of supervision, the right use of nature lessons for instruction in

the facts of life and transmission—these and kindred matters are discussed in a manner that will be found exceedingly helpful. The illustrations and practical suggestions are thoroughly good; but in preparing a second edition, which will certainly be called for, Miss March should avoid such a word as "youthhood" and cut out the repetitions (brevity in a book of this sort is a primary merit). She might also do worse than sacrifice certain irrelevant quotations, poetical and other. The teacher who is provided with this book and the volume by Geddes and Thomson in the Home University Library has all that is needed.

ECONOMIC LIBERALISM. By Hermann Levy. Macmillan, 4/6 net.

IN its original form this study is now twelve years old, and was, one may guess, a very early production of Professor Levy's pen. It has an immature air. There is evidence of reading, but the wood is rather lost for the trees. Professor Levy tries to discover the tap-roots of economic Liberalism—that is, of *laissez faire*—in the Puritan revolution. This linking up of economic thought with religious and philosophic ideas is, of course, no new line of inquiry, though little cultivated in England. This essay of Professor Levy's is not a particularly good specimen of its kind. The conclusions come out so blurred as to leave no clear impression on the mind. The closing chapter, in which the economic controversies of the last eight years loom large, makes us realise what a sundering thing the war is. Political battles, the smoke of which has hardly drifted away, seem to belong to another age. We shall resume something like them no doubt when Europe gets peace again, but it will be in another England.

THE HISTORY OF THE GRAIN TRADE IN FRANCE, 1400-1710. By Albert Payson Usher, Ph. D. (Harvard Economic Series.) Harvard University Press, 1913. 2 dollars.

THIS is an important contribution to the elucidation of the industrial and commercial history of France, the final fruit of which may be, in the hands of some future historian, the presentation of an adequate view of the social and economic condition of monarchical France up to the time of the Revolution, and hence the possibility of a clear understanding of that great cataclysm. Colbert stands out as the most notable figure in Dr. Usher's investigations, and as Colbert was the intellectual father of List, and List of our own Tariff Reformers, all that throws additional light on Colbert and Colbertism has a special interest to English students.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

FRENCH.

Considering that in France the moratorium is still in force, the journalistic and philosophic enterprise of the intellectuals there is remarkable. Of this the *REVUE DE MÉTAPHYSIQUE ET DE MORALE* is a striking example. The committee are now making arrangements for the publication, during the present summer, of Nos. 5 and 6 which were missed out last year, and for the issue, in November, of an extra number which will be given to those readers who renew their subscriptions for 1916. The *Bulletin* of the French Society of Philosophy will also re-appear within the next month or two. Some of the articles in the Review will deal with the war, but others will be purely philosophic as usual.

The *REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE* furnishes further evidence of the vitality of sociological and philosophic interests in France. The April number records that M. René Worms's January-to-March lectures on *The Synthesis of Social Facts* were as well attended as those on *The Analysis of Social Facts* which he delivered before the war broke out; and the March number contains a list of lectures given at the Free College of Social Science in Paris that is excellent though brief. The Sociological Society of Paris has been discussing *The Rights of Small Nations*. One of the debates, reported in the March issue, reveals the fact that the Germans have been hypnotised by the word "empire." The debaters demonstrated that this enshrined an ancient Roman idea to which, in spite of the existence of the British "Empire," no realities belonging to modern days correspond. M. Th. Joran pointed out that Caesar's expeditions were not hatred campaigns, and that he did not attempt to interfere with "the home life, the customs, the soul" of the tribes he vanquished; and M. Grimanelli that in the days of the Roman conquests there were no nations at all, but only huge military monarchies, Oriental theocracies, or free cities with their colonies. He defined a present-day nation as "a collective being sociologically homogeneous, a moral personality every part of which has been intimately associated with every other part, in a well-defined territory, for generations and centuries, during which it has acquired a strong sense of historic solidarity and of a distinctive destiny fulfilling itself uninteruptedly." The debate as a whole very clearly brings out the truth that German imperialism is unsuccessful because it is old-fashioned, so old-fashioned as to be incongruous in a world that is governed by public opinion. In the discussion that is recorded in the April issue M. J. Gabrys and M. Paul Vibert dealt with *The Polish Question*. They deplored the idea that the composite kingdom of 1772 should be re-constituted. The former pleaded that the government of the Poles, who were Slavs, should be separated from that of the Lithuanians, who were a Balkan people; and that the mouth of the Niemen should be assigned to the latter, and the mouth of the Vistula to the former. This report is preceded by a fine paper on *The Future of Small States*, in which Professor Gaston Richard discusses Ratzel's notion that only as long as they are constantly increasing their territory can a people be resourceful and energetic. To this he opposes Comte's idea, of which the localism or regionalism advocated by Dr. Baty and Dr. Hans Torbel seems to be the up-to-date version, that no one could entertain a deep affection for any country larger than Holland, or, indeed,

than a single city with its suburbs. He unifies these two conceptions by showing that it is not the mere size of a country which constitutes its importance and determines the loyalty of the inhabitants to the government. "The grand state is that the people of which have, century by century, achieved great things and set fine examples to the world, and have distinguished themselves in the work of liberating mankind from slavery to blind and unconscious forces." Imperialism, he holds, tends to disintegrate society; but nationalism regenerates it by dividing it into natural groups the well-being of every one of which is compatible with that of every other group.

LA SCIENCE SOCIALE for May and June contains a few notes from a lecture on *Les conditions d'une reprise industrielle* which M. Paul de Rousiers delivered in January before the Society for the Encouragement of National Industry; also an article entitled *En quoi le citoyen allemand est responsable de la guerre*, wherein M. P. Descamps gives an account of the insidious way in which Prussianism has been quelling Liberalism in Germany since the battle of Sadowa. He thinks that the process has completely robbed the people of initiative, insomuch that if they are ever to assert themselves and win political freedom they will have to work out their salvation under the guidance of Jews, "who tend to be as cosmopolitan and anarchic as the Prussian aristocracy is chauvinistic and formal." Under Jewish leaders, M. Descamps surmises, Germany would be less orderly and more exposed to aggression: but their influence would be integrative in those parts of the country in which they are forming large, wealthy, and stable communities; and on the whole it would be bracing and salutary. M. de Rousiers had a good deal to say about the superior intelligence and inferior morality of the Germans in business. Their enterprise in developing and regularising their steamship services and thus opening up markets for their colonial produce had been admirable; but their expedients for ousting rivals had been despicable. If foreigners despatched goods by their ships they would lure the buyer into their own custom by offering him better articles at a lower price, with longer credit; and they persecuted emigrants from Eastern Europe who booked passages to America by English or French or Dutch vessels. French traders could only beat such competitors in the future by co-operation between employers and labourers and by the organisation of production and distribution on a large scale.

To the main contents of the May-June volume the war lends a melancholy interest, for it is a study of rural industry in the central parts of the Lorraine plateau, and it is the work of M. Louis Adelphe, who was killed at Frescati. Fearing, when Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, that he would have to serve in the army, he consigned his manuscript to the publications committee of the Society of Social Science, saying that he hoped he might have an opportunity of revising it later on; and the editor has made selections from it, but has given these to his readers just as they were written.

The March-April number consists mainly of an account of the prosperous population of the industrial districts between the Belgian frontier and the Weser. The author, M. Descamps, seeks to bring the virtues of the German workmen into prominence and does not dwell on their faults. He gives illustrations to show that in spite of the centralising policy of the government local experiments in administration are made oftener in Germany than in France, though not so often as in England; and that the citizens are zealous both in co-operation and in taking the initiative. He admits,

however, that their devotion is rather mechanical, and confesses that as far as poor-law work is concerned he prefers the methods of "The Charity Committee of London" to the Elberfeld system, although the latter certainly defines to perfection the duties of the community to the destitute.

Also received: BULLETIN DE LA STATISTIQUE GÉNÉRALE DE LA FRANCE (October, 1914).

ENGLISH AND AMERICAN.

There is a marked improvement in the tone of the current periodicals and a general tendency towards a calmer and more careful criticism of current events. One of the best instances of the sounder type of thought is Professor J. Arthur Thomson's Galton Lecture reprinted in the April number of the *EUGENICS REVIEW*; his clear and well-balanced paper shows the kind of scientist who preserves a calm outlook both in peace and war and adds value and continuity to our national life.

When we turn, however, from the scientific to the more political reviews, we still find a considerable amount of looseness of thought and an apparent inability to penetrate beneath merely surface values. In the opening article of the *ROUND TABLE* for June the ultimate psychological difficulties of the war are obliterated by more or less misleading generalities representing only one point of view and only one type of mind. It is characteristic of this method of thought that the names of countries are often used where a reference to their inhabitants would be more significant, that generalities as to the tasks of our dominions are discussed without regard to the problems of each separate dominion, and that a journal which professes to deal with the politics of the British Empire devotes no regular section to India. In the first article, on "The Burden of Victory," the question of Britain's contribution to the struggle is discussed and the expedient of the National Register, since adopted by the Government, is recommended. "Finance in War" is an informing article containing a clear exposition of the sources from which wars are paid for and the financial methods which may be used for raising the money. The author, however, has nothing to recommend in the way of practical measures beyond "the most rigid economy throughout the whole community." The possibility of immensely and immediately increasing the home supplies of the necessities of life is not referred to. Under the heading of "The War and Industrial Organisation" we are given a very useful survey of the Government policy with regard to Labour since the outbreak of war. Other papers on "The Foundations of Peace" and on European diplomacy since Bismarck go to make up a number which, if less valuable than some of its predecessors on the score of philosophical suggestion, is serviceable as a record of current events and problems.

Among many excellent articles in the American sociological publications some of the most interesting appear in the March supplement of the *ECONOMIC REVIEW*, and deal with speculation on the stock exchanges: there are few institutions about which there is so much prejudice and so little general knowledge, and it is refreshing to find so fair and lucid a discussion of the financial centre of collective existence. The more philosophic journals scarcely maintain their usual standard, but there are two articles in the *OPEN COURT* for April which are worth careful attention. One is an article by Mr. Westermayr on "The Psychology of Fear" in relation to human conduct, and the other contains extracts from an article by Professor Ostwald in the official German monistic publication *Das*

Montistische Jahrhundert. The first will further the reconstruction of our moral values of Bravery and Fear, a task daily becoming more necessary, while the second will teach us not to generalize too hastily on the narrow and ultra-national nature of modern German philosophy. The Editor's remarks on "My Opponents" in the May number of the same periodical are not as profound or thoughtful as some of his other writings. It is curious that philosophers, so careful in their own particular sphere of study, often enter the field of national psychology or international politics in quite another spirit; content with the most ill-considered and doubtful knowledge, they utter statements and prophecies on subjects which even those with the most experience and fullest information treat with diffidence.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY.

REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1914.

THE past year has been, of necessity, the most difficult period in the Society's history. In normal times the Council is enabled as a rule to make partial arrangements for the work of the autumn session before separating for the summer holidays. In 1914 all possible efforts of this kind were rendered impossible by the European crisis of July and the outbreak of war. In the then state of the public mind it was impossible to say whether meetings could be held, or whether it would prove advisable for the Society to suspend operations. The alternatives were discussed by the Council, and it was decided that the better plan was to arrange for a somewhat smaller number of meetings than usual, the subjects of papers to be as far as practicable related to the social and international problems brought into prominence by the war. Such problems were very numerous, and any endeavour to organise discussion upon even a few of the more important of them would have involved resources far beyond those at the command of the Sociological Society. A further obstacle was the difficulty of obtaining papers from people of authoritative standing during the first stages of the war when work in all departments of professional life was gravely interfered with by the course of public events.

The programme during the first part of the year comprised the following papers:—

- Jan. 12.—Professor Geddes on I. "A Notation of Life (Social and Organic)," and II. "An Interpretation of Parnassus."
- Feb. 10.—Dr. William Brown on "Psycho-Analysis and the Problem of Personality."
- Feb. 24.—Dr. C. W. Saleeby on "The First Decade of Modern Eugenics, 1904—1914."
- Mar. 10.—Mr. F. R. Cana on "The Future of the Kaffir."
- Mar. 31.—Annual Meeting; followed by Mr. S. K. Ratcliffe on "Changing America."
- May 5.—Mr. E. A. Filene on "Coming Social and Business Changes."
- May 19.—Mr. G. Spiller on "Darwinism and Sociology."

The following papers were read during the last three months of the year:—

- Nov. 10.—Professor C. A. Ellwood on "The Social Problem and the Present War." Lord Bryce in the chair.
- Nov. 25.—Mr. J. A. Hobson on "War in its Relation to Wage Earners." Professor Hobhouse in the chair.

In addition, mainly through the efforts of Mr. Branford, two special conferences were held: one on "Co-operative Credit in Relation to Problems of the War" (The Mobilisation of National Credit), the other on "City and Rural Surveys," the original suggestion of the latter conference coming from the paper contributed by Professor Geddes and printed in the *Sociological Review* of January, 1915.

STUDY GROUPS.

The most noteworthy feature of the year under review was the development of the Study Groups. The success attending the work of the Social Psychology Group, formed three years ago, has been most gratifying; and as a consequence the Council sanctioned the establishment of other groups framed on a similar plan—each group to be small enough to secure effective discussion and large enough to bring variety of opinions into play. The European situation inevitably overshadows all other subjects of discussion, and towards the end of the year a group for the study of International Relations and Organisation for Permanent Peace was formed with Mr. J. A. Hobson as chairman and Mrs. Mabel Palmer as hon. secretary and convener. More lately a Law Group has been started under the chairmanship of Dr. W. R. Bisschop, with Miss Chrystal Macmillan as vice-chairman. The groups meet once or twice a month in the rooms of the Sociological Society. Steps have been taken since the close of the year to start several other groups, the record of which will properly come into next year's report.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW.

A question of some difficulty presented itself in October in connection with the *Sociological Review*. It was clear that the Society would be compelled to practise the strictest economy during and after the period of the war, and it was accordingly decided to reduce the size of the *Review* from 100 to 70–80 pages. By this means a small saving is effected, but there remains the difficulty of meeting that part of the expenditure which is not covered by the Guarantee Fund. The Fund was, through the generosity of the Hon. Treasurer and a small number of members, renewed in 1912 for three years. That term will end with the issue of the October number of the *Review* this year, and it will then be necessary for the Council to reconsider the whole situation, in view, more particularly, of the increased difficulty, owing to war conditions, of maintaining a journal upon which the yearly loss is unavoidably heavy.

MEMBERSHIP AND INCOME.

In existing circumstances and until peace is restored the Society cannot hope for any considerable increase of membership. The Council would indeed regard the situation as reasonably satisfactory if, so long as the war lasts, the membership were to remain at the level of 1913–14 and the expenditure, apart from the *Review*, be kept within the limit of the modest income at present obtained through the members' subscriptions. In 1914 this result was not practicable. The balance sheet shows that upon the year's working there is a deficit of £79 9s. 1d., including the deficits of past years. On the *Review* account the deficit for the year is £298 5s. 4d. This includes a deficit from past years of £230 14s. 8d. The total indebtedness of the Society and the *Review* is thus £377 14s. 5d.